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Working memory (WM) is a finite-capacity cognitive resource that maintains and 
manipulates the contents of one’s current thoughts. It determines the complexity both of 
problems one can solve and thoughts one can have. Of central concern is the currency of WM: 
what kind of information takes up space. Traditional accounts of WM have assumed the currency 
to be chunks (memory), visual objects (vision), or relational role-bindings (reasoning). Recent 
findings in visual WM suggest that when a set of items (e.g., a circle and a square) are compared 
with one or more relations (e.g., larger, left of, above), what takes up space is the set of items 
rather than the number of relations. Extra relations can be “stacked” onto the existing 
representation without additional WM cost - the number of relations make no difference. This 
dissertation explores the currency of verbal WM, specifically, whether the kind of “stacking” 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Modern models of working memory (WM) are diverse, yet they all agree that working 
memory capacity is finite (e.g., Baddeley, 2012, Cowan, 2001, and Zhang and Luck, 2008). Its 
limits are especially apparent when compared to the larger sensory store or to long-term 
memory, which is often considered virtually unlimited. Yet it is a crucial bottleneck: working 
memory limits the complexity of thought (Andrews and Halford, 2002). Individual differences in 
working memory capacity (WMC; i.e., in how many items can be maintained) predict ability in 
many domains, including language, problem-solving, teaching, etc. Likewise, training on how to 
more efficiently use one’s given capacity is foundational to expertise, while reduction of 
available WMC via extraneous load (e.g., from dual-tasks or stress) impairs reasoning and 
problem-solving performance. Therefore the mind best serves its goals by taking the fullest 
advantage of this limited capacity. 
But there has been implicit disagreement (and, surprisingly, little explicit debate) about 
how to characterize this capacity – specifically, about what counts as an item. Miller argued that 
for words presented in lists, an item is a chunk – a set of information meaningfully connected in 
long-term memory. Yet reasoning tasks show that an item is the binding of an object to a role in 
a relational concept (Halford et al., 1998). The vision literature (e.g., Luck and Vogel, 1997; 
Zhang and Luck, 2011) sees an item as a visual object -- a collection of features bound together 
in space. Clevenger and Hummel (2014) showed that even in the world of vision, these views of 
capacity are too simple – they cannot account for the perception and memory of relations 
between visual objects. These constructs (especially “chunks”) are vague enough to avoid 
explicit debates in the literature, but they belie unspoken assumptions about the form of 
information in WM’s limited-capacity store. 
Even if we grant that these differing conceptions of WM currency are equally valid and 
merely reflect different WM subsystems or task demands, the definition of a chunk is still 
unclear. Much research treats a chunk in WM as a pointer to a pre-existing pattern in LTM. But 
this leaves many questions unanswered. For example, how are chunks created in the first place?  
What differs between the processes that create new chunks vs those that recode information to 
match existing chunks? What are the building blocks of chunks? What are the constraints that 
determine whether new chunks can be successfully created? What other types of compression 
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exist in WM and how are they related to chunking? Despite these open questions, two points are 
well-understood: chunking is a type of compression, and it is very powerful.  
This thesis will explore how our cognitive architecture makes the most of its limited 
working memory capacity. It will focus especially on how relational information is used and 
compressed (“chunked”) in working memory. The chosen paradigm for broaching this topic is 
relational stacking, a phenomenon that has been demonstrated in vision (Clevenger and Hummel, 
2014). The idea is that, given an already-encoded set of items and a relation between them, extra 
relations can be added on top (or “stacked”) for free. For example, if one is shown a visual 
display consisting of a circle and square, encoding “the circle is left of, and larger than, the 
square” takes the same amount of WMC as simply “the circle is left of the square.” (This point 
will be described in more detail later.) Yet despite its usefulness in vision, it is still unknown 
whether stacking can be applied to the abstract relations that are ubiquitous in cognition more 
broadly.  
A cognitive stacking effect, if observed, would inform the question of the nature of 
chunks and how they are created. Stacking implies that the building blocks of a chunk are the 
items compared to one another on one or more relations. For example, in vision, if “the circle is 
left of, and larger than, the square”, the circle and square are the units that take up space. 
Likewise, given the more cognitive example, “Roger is smarter, and less interesting, than Gene,” 
Roger and Gene take up space. As I will explain later, an important constraint to this type of 
compression is that the items are compared with a certain syntax.  
If cognitive stacking exists, it could prove immensely impactful across many human 
domains. It is a tool for compression, which has proven extremely powerful in a huge variety of 
areas, including expertise, language, and reasoning. A major part of expertise is building a 
repertoire of chunks within a domain, allowing the expert to reduce WM load, notice important 
patterns, and develop intelligent strategies in response. Chunking also underlies fast and fluent 
language comprehension – from the point of view of a new language learner, even a single 
sentence is an overwhelming amount of information. In written form, each letter is composed of 
several lines, each word of several letters, and each sentence of several words. But with practice, 
a capital letter “A” is compressed from potentially three slots in WM (for the three lines) to just 
one; and the word “aardvark” is compressed from 8 letters to just one concept. Chunking thus 
allows us to handle more complex reasoning across domains in higher cognition.  
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As I will later explain in more detail, compression acts as a pointer to a known pattern, 
which can be unpacked when needed. However, compression is limited (it will become clear 
how these limits work in the discussion of models of WM) and it does come with trade-offs. 
In the sections that follow, I will elaborate on each of these points by way of motivating 
the proposed experiments. 
WM AS A CENTRAL BOTTLENECK IN HUMAN COGNITION 
Working memory’s importance in human cognition has been demonstrated in numerous 
ways, including the effects of dual-tasks on various cognitive tasks, the course of cognitive 
development, and examinations of individual differences. The common thread across these 
methods is that WM acts as a bottleneck that sharply limits the complexity of problems a person 
can solve.   
Dual-task paradigms in a variety of higher-order tasks show that performance on a 
primary task degrades as the working memory load of a simultaneous secondary task increases 
(Morrison, 2005). For example, Gilhooly et al. (1993) required subjects to answer questions 
about verbal syllogisms – premises that can be followed to a logical conclusion. For example, 
given the syllogism “Some actors are singers. All the singers are dancers. Therefore, ______” the 
correct conclusion is, “Some actors are dancers.” Crucially, WM load was manipulated: in the 
high load condition, a whole set of syllogisms was given all-at-once verbally, requiring subjects 
to maintain the whole set in order to calculate and record their answers. In the low-load 
condition, the syllogisms were continuously available for reference onscreen until subjects 
finished recording their answers. There were significantly more errors in the high load condition. 
In a similar study, Toms, Morris, and Ward (1993) found that a high concurrent WM load (e.g., 
maintaining six digits) interfered with difficult (but not simple) syllogisms.  
Dual-task methodology also shows the importance of WM to analogical reasoning. For 
example, Tohill and Holyoak (2000) showed that experimentally-induced anxiety reduces the 
working memory capacity available for analogical reasoning, causing people to fall back on 
simpler, less memory-intensive featural reasoning. The same effect is found when WM load is 
imposed by requiring subjects to either maintain a set of digits given to them or to generate 
random digits while simultaneously performing a primary analogical mapping task (Waltz, Lau, 
Grewal, and Holyoak, 2000). Dual task methods have also been used to find out which WM 
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subsystems are important to which kinds of analogy problems. Cho, Holyoak, and Cannon 
(2007) found that random number generation, which is especially taxing on the central executive, 
predictably interfered with both visual and verbal analogy problems; however when WM load 
was induced onto specific subsystems (i.e., via articulatory suppression vs. “spatial tapping”), 
interference was stronger when solving problems of matching sensory modalities. The consistent 
and large deleterious effect of central executive load makes sense given that the central executive 
is used in all WM tasks.  
WM has been implicated in the development of relational reasoning during childhood. 
Young children tend to map analogs based on featural similarity when relational similarity 
proves too demanding on WM resources (Richland, Morrison, and Holyoak, 2004). However, as 
children age their responses undergo a relational shift, revealing sensitivity to relational rather 
than literal similarity between items in analogies (Gentner, 1988; Ratterman & Gentner, 1998). 
This effect has been attributed to both increases in conceptual knowledge and increases in WM 
capacity. Andrews and Halford (2002) estimate that WM capacity (defined in terms of role 
bindings) increases with age as follows: unary relations at 1 year, binary relations at 2 years, 
ternary relations at 5 years, and quaternary relations at 11 years.  
These findings, among others (see, e.g., Cowan, 2001, for a review) demonstrate that 
relational reasoning is dependent on WM capacity. Accordingly, factors that influence the 
capacity of WM, or the efficiency with which we use the finite WM capacity we have, stand to 
strongly affect our ability to reason (see Penn, et al., 2008). More concretely, as Tohill and 
Holyoak (2000) point out, analogical reasoning has an extraordinary range of uses: generation 
and comprehension of metaphors, scientific discovery, and decision making in politics, business, 
the law, and everyday social situations. 
Another hallmark of the role of WM in human thinking concerns the effects of individual 
differences in WM capacity: Individual differences in working memory ability are powerful 
predictors of performance on an impressive variety of cognitive abilities. Tests of WM capacity 
in which processing and storage are interleaved (e.g., answering a series of math problems while 
retaining the results of each problem) are especially powerful predictors. For example, in the 
domain of language comprehension, WMC correlates well with measures of reading 
comprehension such as verbal scores on both the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and the Nelson-
Denny Reading Comprehension Test (Daneman and Merikle, 1996), vocabulary learning 
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(Daneman & Green, 1986), and spelling (Ormrod & Cochran, 1988). WMC also predicts 
proficiency at following directions (Engle, Carullo, & Collins, 1991), logic learning (Kyllonen & 
Stephens, 1990), taking lecture notes (Kiewra & Benton, 1988), and the ability to deal with life-
event stress (Klein & Boals, 2001). Some have even argued that an evolutionary increase in WM 
capacity allowed an emergent understanding of tool use (Kunde, Musseler, & Heuer, 2007).   
In fact, working memory capacity may be the key factor that distinguishes between high 
and low g, general intelligence (Cowan and Morey, 2007; for a review, see Conway, Kane, and 
Engle, 2003). Initial work produced correlations between WMC and g of near-unity, a result so 
impressive that some suggested the two constructs were one and the same (e.g., Carpenter, Just, 
& Shell, 1990; Kyllonen and Christal, 1990). The WMC-g relation has proved consistent even in 
more cautious, recent work using latent variable analyses: Engle, et al. (1999) found complex 
WM span tasks a significant predictor of general fluid ability (r = 0.59). Likewise, Ackerman et 
al. (2002) and Conway et al. (2002) found correlations of r = 0.58 and 0.60, respectively. A 
comprehensive study in this vein re-analyzed the data of 10 published studies addressing WMC 
and g, including more than 3,100 young-adult subjects, and found “a strong correlation between 
WMC and Gf/reasoning factors (median r = 0.72), indicating that the WMC and Gf constructs 
share approximately 50% of their variance” (Kane, Hambrick, and Conway, 2005).  
Another way WM shows itself as an important bottleneck is its role in supporting the 
superior performance of experts in their domains (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995; Ericsson et al., 
2004). In fact, one way to increase one’s effective WM capacity in a domain is to become expert 
in that domain. Much of this expertise depends on learning to rapidly form meaningful chunks of 
relevant information—that is, to manage WM capacity limits intelligently. Chess champions, for 
example, can memorize with near-perfect accuracy the positions of mid-game chess pieces on a 
board (de Groot, 1965). But this ability vanishes when presented with a random arrangement of 
pieces, for which chess experts perform no better than novices in a short-term recall task (Chase 
and Simon, 1973). Thus, chess masters don’t have unusually good memory in general. Instead, 
they encode using a huge library of well-learned chunks, making an otherwise overwhelming 
mass of information fit easily into their WM. This learned, domain-specific chunking ability is a 
basic feature of expertise in many domains, including medicine (G. R. Norman, Brooks, & Allen, 
1989); music (Sloboda, 1976); electronics (Egan & Schwartz, 1979); and computer programming 
(McKeithen, Reitman, Rueter, & Hirtle, 1981). 
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CURRENCY OF WM 
Any model of how we make the most efficient use of our limited WM capacity must also 
address the question of currency. Working memory is limited in the number of items it can hold. 
But for this statement to be meaningful, we must determine its currency (what counts as an 
item): A person for whom Beethoven’s entire 9th symphony is a single chunk is likely to reason 
very differently from a person for whom each musical note is its own chunk.  
I will first review major theories of working memory currency, including items as 
chunks, items as visual objects, and items as role-bindings in relational reasoning. I will then 
introduce relational stacking, a recently discovered effect which sees items in terms of sets of 
things being compared.  
Items as chunks 
Miller (1956) noted that the immediate memory span for information presented 
sequentially in lists was remarkably consistent across stimulus types. Whether the lists consisted 
of binary digits, decimal digits, letters of the alphabet, or monosyllabic English words, people 
could remember about 7 (plus or minus 2) pieces of information. He concluded that the capacity 
of working memory was limited not by amount of information per se, but by the number of units 
that the learner makes meaningful via knowledge from long-term memory.  
Miller called these meaningful units “chunks” to emphasize their amorphous sizes – a 
chunk could be as small as a single letter or as large as an acronym with several words. For 
example, the string of letters “FBICIANSA” might be coded as nine chunks (if the learner only 
recognizes individual letters) or as three larger chunks (if the learner recognizes the common 
acronyms: FBI-CIA-NSA). Note that according to Miller’s believed capacity limit of seven 
chunks, this same string of information can either easily fit into WM, or be far too large. 
Chunking thus sidesteps the limit on number of items by making those items larger, functionally 
increasing WM’s capacity. 
Cowan (2001) built on the item-as-chunk literature by adding more sophisticated 
measurement techniques, showing that Miller underestimated the size of participants’ chunks and 
therefore overestimated their number. Cowan’s experiments converged on a limit of four chunks, 
rather than the original seven.  
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Cowan eventually arrived at this “magic number four” based on the insight that pure 
estimates of WM capacity are only possible if steps are taken to prevent re-coding. Because re-
coding is a deliberative and time-consuming process, it can be prevented by overwhelming the 
learner and making her unwilling or unable to make the necessary effort. This has been 
accomplished in several ways, including the use of very large sets of to-be-learned items, very 
brief study opportunities, and cognitively-demanding dual tasks. Re-coding can also be limited 
by the careful choice of study items that don’t lend themselves to such strategies. The latter 
strategy is borrowed in this thesis’s experiments. 
Cowan’s other important contribution (for our purposes) was to reconcile item-limited 
theories of WM with theories that posit continuous pools of resources. The best-known example 
of the latter is Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) model, which includes a central executive that 
coordinates access to and from a number of modality-specific buffers. The most-studied such 
buffer is the phonological loop, an auditory system believed to hold about 2 seconds of spoken 
information. Cowan’s claim is that item- and pool-limited WM systems work together in the 
following way: there exist a number of modality-specific WM buffers which are limited not by 
quantity of information per se but instead by how long information is kept active and available. 
The time-limited buffers hold the raw materials from which item-limited subsystems draw. The 
job of the “focus of attention”, which is analogous to Baddeley’s central executive, is to reach 
into these time-limited pools of information to form discrete items.  
This reconciliation will become important later because it bears on criticism that item 
limit tests are “just” reflections/confounds of continuous-resource-limits – after all, any WM task 
necessarily engages both item- and pool-based limits. For example, suppose you are given a long 
list of words to remember: horse, table, filibuster, mattress, envelope, etc. Your eventual 
performance is constrained by two limits simultaneously – assuming you have average memory, 
you are limited to ~2 seconds of spoken information (pool limit), from which you can form up to 
4 items or chunks (item limit).   
Items as visual objects 
Vision is one domain in which our intuition about currency is straightforward and is 
borne out by the data. Indeed, discrete slot models in the vision literature consider the unit of 
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WM to be a visual object, where an object is defined as a collection of features bound together in 
space.  
A change detection paradigm popularized by Luck and Vogel (1997) provides 
compelling evidence for the items-as-visual-objects view. In this paradigm, subjects were first 
shown a 100 ms sample array of 1-12 squares. This was followed by a 900 ms blank display 
interval, and finally by a 2,000 ms test array which was either identical or differed by one feature 
of a single square. The task was to determine whether the sample and test arrays were identical 
or different. Participants were able to detect changes in arrays of up to 4 objects, implying they 
could retain roughly 4 objects in working memory. Crucially, performance remained the same 
whether each object consisted of only a single feature or a conjunction of up to four features at 
once. This result suggests that WM load in vision is determined by the number of objects rather 
than the complexity of each object. In other words, extra features can be stacked onto an existing 
object representation without additional cost. 
Zhang and Luck (2011) bolstered the items-as-objects view with a modification of this 
paradigm. They also presented subjects with a brief sample array of squares, followed soon after 
by a memory judgment. But in this case, at test they cued the location of one of the sample 
squares, and required subjects to indicate the color of the cued square on a continuous color 
wheel. The precision required for the color choice was also manipulated. In the high-precision 
condition, the color wheel consisted of all 180 colors taken from a master set. In the low-
precision condition, the color wheel consisted of either 6 or 9 colored spokes, one of which was 
the color of the cued object. They reasoned that if the recalled color is close to the original color, 
the probed item has been stored in WM. If the recalled color is random, this indicates the subject 
has no information about the probed item, and thus it has not been stored in WM. Furthermore, if 
WM limits are truly item-based (as opposed to resource-based), reducing the demanded precision 
for studied items should not increase the number of items that can be stored. The results were 
consistent with the objects-as-items view: the average VWM capacity was estimated at 2.4 items, 
regardless of the required precision of the representations. 
These results in vision suggest a parallel to chunking in the verbal WM literature. A 
visual object fills a slot in working memory regardless of its complexity with respect to number 
of features. Similarly, assuming a chunk matches a well-learned pattern in LTM, it can consist of 
many words, phrases, or numbers – but it fills only one slot regardless of this complexity. 
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Items as role-bindings in relational reasoning 
 We cannot fully address WM’s role in many cognitive tasks if we consider capacity 
purely in terms of the number of items stored. Many tasks also require manipulating items (e.g., 
Engle & Kane, 2004; Engle, 2010) or encoding the relationships between the items (e.g., 
Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003). Analogical reasoning, for 
example, allows inference and learning about a target domain via comparison to a well-known 
source domain with a similar relational structure.   To understand the analogy “bear is to cub as 
bird is to chick”, one must not only store the items, but also bind each item to a slot in a 
relational concept. Within the relation PARENT-OF, bear is bound to the ADULT role and cub 
is bound to the CHILD role.  
 Working memory capacity has been expressed in terms of relational role-bindings in a 
series of experiments by Halford, et al. (2005). They showed that the difficulty of various 
reasoning problems is determined by relational complexity (i.e., the number of simultaneously-
held role-bindings required to solve them). In particular, consistent with Cowan’s (2001) 
estimate, four role-bindings seems to be the average upper-limit of working memory capacity. 
One such study tested reasoning about interactions between variables. Participants answered 
questions about interactions between different attributes of cake with respect to liking the cake, 
based on graphs and accompanying written descriptions (see Figure 1.) On average, people could 
understand interactions of up to (but not beyond) four variables. 
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Figure 1. Halford’s (2005) “cake task”. On each trial, participants were shown a bar graph 
(example above) and an accompanying verbal description. The graph showed hypothetical data 
from a survey relating cake characteristics to how much people like the cake. Participants were 
then asked a fill-in-the-blank question that assessed their understanding of either a two-, three-, 
or four-way interaction. 
 
 This view provides a new way of understanding the nature and origin of WM capacity 
limits: in short, WM load is the price of the flexibility afforded by dynamic role-filler binding. 
Relational roles can be filled by nearly anything, depending on the situation (the larger-than role 
might be played by an ant, an elephant, or a planet). In fact, Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli (2008) 
argue that the many cognitive advantages humans enjoy over other animals result from this 
ability to flexibly combine relational roles with their fillers (Hummel & Biederman, 1992; 
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003). But this flexibility comes at a cost – because role-filler 
bindings are subject to change, they cannot be retrieved from a stable pattern in LTM. Instead, 
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they require attention and WM resources to encode and maintain (Cowan, 2001; Halford et al, 
1998; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003).  
This may be a domain-general feature of WM: there is also precedent in the attention 
literature for a WM cost of dynamic rather than pre-learned associations. Specifically, tasks that 
are performed with consistent (i.e., one-to-one) mappings between a given stimulus and the 
proper response can become automatic with practice, thus consuming few (if any) attentional 
resources. In contrast, tasks with inconsistent (i.e., one-to-many) stimulus-response mappings 
remain deliberate and come with attentional costs. For example, if any time letters of the 
alphabet appear, the correct response is always “yes”, participants learn to quickly and easily 
make this response. If letters sometime require “yes” and sometimes “no” responses, depending 
on information given in the beginning of each trial, then performance remains relatively slow 
and error-prone (i.e., not automatic; Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977.) This reflects the WM 
demands of per-trial dynamic bindings of a particular letter to the appropriate response.  
Tradeoffs with chunking and compression 
Our memory systems are faced with a difficult problem – acting intelligently, solving 
problems, and other higher-order abilities demand that we process large amounts of information. 
Yet every theory of WM, and empirical data with WM tasks, agree that a hard limit exists on the 
number of items we can hold (whether they are measured as objects, verbal chunks, RBs, etc.) 
Therefore, we make use of chunking – which can take the form of adding extra features on a 
visual object, activating complex conceptual networks by a single verbal phrase or word chunk, 
and so on – to fit more information into the same number of items. 
But chunking comes with tradeoffs. First, it requires cognitive resources (e.g., processing 
time for both the creation and later unpacking of chunks: Cowan, 2004; Ericsson and Kintsch, 
1995). But the central tradeoff is this: although more complex units (currency) can squeeze more 
into WM, they (sometimes) do so at the cost of unitizing the more complex elements. The atomic 
symbol “coffee shop” takes only one slot in WM but does not specify the parts of a coffee shop 
or how they relate to one another. This is what chunking is about. 
There is one kind of chunking that seems to come without this unitizing tradeoff: The 
stacking of multiple roles onto the same set of objects. Stacking also seems immune to the 
requirement for existing associations – instead, it can be done with new information (this is kind 
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of like the stacking of features onto visual objects in visual WM; but it is unlike chunking of 
verbal materials à la Cowan, Miller, etc.)  
Relational stacking in vision: items as sets being compared 
 Many skills and cognitive abilities depend on the perception of spatial relations between 
visual objects. Consider using a map to navigate a college campus. This might require holding 
several role-bindings: you might relate items on the map (the student union is above the quad, 
which is above the auditorium) while simultaneously relating yourself to things in the physical 
world (the student union is to my left). Getting some or all of these role-bindings mixed up is an 
effective way for a first-time visitor to get lost. Therefore, understanding how we encode and 
maintain such spatial relations is worthwhile. 
Clevenger and Hummel (2014) aimed to discover the working memory load imposed by 
the perception and maintenance of spatial relations. They showed that WM load scales with the 
number of pairs of objects being compared, rather than with the number of objects or of role-
bindings. We call this arrangement relational stacking for reasons that will become clear shortly. 
Because their work inspired the present experiments, I will describe it in some detail. 
 
Figure 2. Reprinted with permission from Clevenger and Hummel (2014). Existing theories of 
WM capacity make disparate predictions on the load needed to encode spatial relationships 
(e.g., between a set of visual objects such as the ones above). The most obvious reading of the 
items-as-objects account predicts the entire display’s relations can be encoded with a load of 
only 4 items. The items-as-role-bindings account is much less generous, already equaling a load 
of 4 with encoding 2 relationships between a pair of items. 
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In the first experiment, participants were shown sets of objects (as in Figure 2) and tasked 
with encoding the spatial relations among the objects. Each trial began with a 2000 ms study 
display of irregularly shaped polygons. The polygons were given randomly generated sizes and 
positions, with each polygon touching at least one of the others. This was followed by a 500 ms 
pattern mask. Finally, a probe question displayed two of the objects along with a word indicating 
a relational role (e.g., “larger”). Participants had to choose which object in the given pair filled 
that relational role in the study display. (See Figure 3 for an example trial). The relations used 
were larger-than, left-of, and above.  
 
Figure 3.  An example trial from Clevenger and Hummel (2014). Reprinted with permission. The 
2000-ms study display consisted of 2, 3, or 4 objects. This was followed by a 500-ms pattern 
mask. Finally, a query asked which of two given objects had satisfied the relational role in the 
study display. 
Crucially, the amount of relational information at study was manipulated in two ways. 
First, the study display contained either 2, 3, or 4 objects (varied within-subjects). Second, each 
probe’s relation was drawn from a pool of either 1, 2, or 3 visual relations (varied between-
subjects). For example, a subject in the 1-relation condition would be asked about the same 
relation for every probe in the experiment. Subjects in the 2-relation condition would always be 
asked about one of the same two relations. In the 1- and 2-relation conditions, each subject was 
assigned a subset of the 3 visual relations via counterbalancing.  
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This paradigm allowed a new test between the item-as-role-binding and item-as-visual-
object accounts. The role-binding-limited account makes the miserly prediction that we can 
maintain only a small fraction of the display’s spatial relations. More specifically, this account 
predicts that load increases along with both number of objects and number of relations. For 
example, if each role-binding occupies one slot, then larger (2,1) requires two slots – one for 
larger(2) and one for smaller(1). Every additional relation between 2 and 1 requires another pair 
of slots. Encoding all three relations between even this single object pair would require six slots 
and therefore exceed the capacity of a typical person. Likewise, adding just one more object 
greatly increases the number of role-bindings onscreen – with three objects, there are three 
potential test pairs. Given three objects, even the single relation condition translates to six role-
bindings onscreen – again, exceeding the typical person’s WM capacity.  
In contrast, object-limited models (i.e., Luck and Vogel, 1997; Zhang and Luck, 2008) 
make generous predictions in this paradigm. If an object and all of its features occupy just one 
slot, then any relational query about an object pair can be answered if both objects have been 
encoded. In other words, with a typical capacity of 4, an entire 4-object display (the largest used 
in the experiment) would still fit in WM.  
These two models can be combined, producing a middle ground both in what counts as 
an item and in the resulting load induced by relational tasks. On this view, slots are filled by the 
objects being compared but not by the relations between those objects. For example, when 
encoding an object pair such as (2,1), it becomes a linked pair that takes up two slots. The 
relations between these objects could then be added on top without additional cost. In other 
words, the relations could be “stacked” onto the object pair, just as the vision account “stacks” 
extra features onto a single object. We refer to this hybrid account as relational stacking. 
Accuracy in each condition was predicted with equations based on the role-binding, 
object, and stacking (“hybrid”) models of WM. Accuracy was given as a function of both WM 
load and task-relevant memory processes, including encoding, forgetting, guessing, etc. 
Importantly, the models produce different predictions only insofar as they make different 
assumptions about currency and, thus, WM load. Figure 4 shows load and accuracy predictions 
by condition for the role-binding, object, and stacking (“hybrid”) models. 
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Figure 4. Predicted WM load by condition from Clevenger and Hummel (2014). 
 
Figure 5 shows the obtained accuracy data – the mean proportion correct in each of the 9 
conditions. The data were fitted against the predictions of all three models using both RMSD and 
proportion of variance accounted for. By both measures, the stacking (“hybrid”) model showed 
the best fit – accuracy decreased with the square of the number of objects (corresponding to the 
number of potential object pairs), but not with the number of relations tested. In other words, 
additional relational roles can be “stacked” onto an existing object pair at no additional cost. The 
stacking account is also more successful in that the best-fitting hybrid model resides in a more 
realistic range of k, working memory capacity, than either the items-as-role-bindings or items-as-
visual-objects models. 
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Figure 5. Mean proportion of correct responses by condition from Clevenger and Hummel 
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CHAPTER 2: CAN NONVISUAL RELATIONS BE STACKED IN WORKING 
MEMORY? 
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM 
 The present experiments will investigate whether relational stacking also obtains in the 
verbal world. Verbal relational stacking would have important implications for current models of 
WM. It would inform the currency question by showing that items are not individual role-
bindings per se but sets of arguments that can be compared on multiple relations at once. More 
broadly, it would also suggest common mechanisms in the cognitive architectures underlying 
visual and verbal working memory. 
Relational stacking of verbal material could also provide far-reaching cognitive benefits. 
Given the fundamental role WMC plays in problem-solving, expertise, intelligence, etc., any 
technique for widening this bottleneck is worthwhile. This is especially so if verbal relational 
stacking can approach the impressive efficiency of visual relational stacking.  
General Methods 
These experiments draw from Clevenger and Hummel (2014) but translate the task from 
visual to verbal. The trials thus have the same general structure as the previous work: each trial 
begins with a study display of relational information. Then after a short delay, a probe question 
asks whether a relational fact was true in the study display. In these experiments, however, the 
relational information consists of written facts comparing pairs of novel people (e.g., “Roger is 
more careful than Billy”). Relational stacking predicts that additional pieces of relational 
information (i.e., role-bindings) are easier to remember when they relate an already-given pair 
(e.g., “Roger is less curious than Billy”) than when they relate a new pair (e.g., “Rick is less 
curious than Jessica”).  
 Why might we expect that verbal working memory can use this heuristic? Consider the 
computational problem that must be solved to represent relations. To encode a relational fact, 
each item must be explicitly placed in a particular relational role – for example, LARGER 
(battleship, dog) places the battleship in the “larger” role and the dog in the “smaller” role. This 
syntax seems to allow stacking of additional relations on the same pair because the more-than 
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and less-than roles are common to all relations which compare magnitude on some trait. Thus, a 
single explicit ordering of items could unambiguously capture how they fill roles in several 
relational concepts at once. For example, we may not lose any meaning by stacking several more 
relations onto the dog-battleship pair – LARGER,SLOWER,HEAVIER,RUSTIER (battleship, 
dog). 
  But our verbal and visual systems differ in several important ways that might preclude 
relational stacking.  Much visual processing is known to be massively parallel and fast (e.g., 
Hummel and Biederman, 1992). In contrast, understanding written material depends on cognitive 
systems for spoken language, which is highly serial and sequential. This difference in mode of 
processing might alone predict an inability to stack written relations.   
The relatively large number of relations used in cognition more broadly, as compared 
with those in vision, might also pose a problem. This problem stems from how connectionist 
(distributed) systems represent meaning. Unlike symbolic representations, which more neatly 
segment meaning into discrete symbols (dog, cat), distributed representations break down each 
concept into a set of mutually connected (fire-together) units that each contribute some part of 
the meaning. The meaning is not found in any one unit, but rather emerges from the activity of 
the whole set. Distributed systems often rely on a shared pool of conceptual building blocks or 
semantic primitives from which the larger concepts are formed. But if many concepts draw from 
this finite pool of semantic primitives, there is more potential for confusion between them. For 
example, “cat” consists of individual units that mean small, pet, meows, potty-trained, furry, etc. 
“Dog” is confusable with “cat” to the extent it shares some of the same building blocks, such as 
pet, furry, etc.  
This limitation of connectionist systems can be applied to relations in the visual vs verbal 
domains. Confusion caused by shared semantic primitives actually poses a much greater threat to 
verbal rather than visual relations. Consider that in the visual domain, there is a very limited set 
of potential relations – from the very basic, such as larger-than, left-or-right-of, in front of, etc. – 
to the more dynamic or complex, such as pushing-on, supporting, etc. Because they are so few, 
visual relations may be semantically distinct enough that their representations can be 
superimposed without introducing ambiguity. In contrast, the relations used in cognition more 
broadly are both more numerous and more open-ended. Consider just how numerous the 
cognitive relations are – they include smarter-than, more-trustworthy-than, more-surprising-
  19 
than, and scarier-than (as you can see, nearly any concept can be turned into a relation.) The 
semantic similarity or overlap inherent to such a large set of relations may prevent unambiguous 
superposition (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997). 
Discouraging Non-Relational Encoding Heuristics 
As is often the case, greater experimental control comes at the cost of reduced ecological 
validity. The present experiments used the sometimes stilted comparative phrases “more than” or 
“less than” with every relation (e.g., “Clyde is more tall than Hector”) because doing so provided 
two advantages when constructing probe questions. First, the exact same names and adjectives 
could be used at both study and test; and second, the original fact could undergo every 
conceivable transformation, to create either an "old" or a "new" fact. The use of identical words 
prevented guessing correctly based only on simple recognition memory of individual words from 
the study phase (as opposed to memory for correct role-bindings).  
So why do these benefits constrain word choice? Consider a more naturally phrased 
relational fact: “Mark is taller than Jerry.” To change its meaning, it could be rewritten simply 
as, “Jerry is taller than Mark.” But if meaning is changed with this operation, then argument 
order is a clue. (The names are reversed, so it must mean something different – thus, a savvy 
participant would guess “No”.) The meaning could instead be changed by saying, “Mark is 
shorter than Jerry.” But then the clue is even more obvious – the probe question includes a word 
not seen in the study display. Additionally, the transformed fact in this case may have a subtly 
different meaning (e.g., linguistic markedness). 
Now consider the original statement rephrased in an apparently awkward way: “Mark is 
more tall than Jerry.” Here I can manipulate meaning independently of argument order: “Mark is 
less tall than Jerry.” And I do so without changing the original relation word. This approach also 
standardizes how the relations are transformed into comparatives. Any relational word can be 
preceded by “more” or “less”: more tall, less fastidious, etc. On the other hand, natural phrasing 
requires that some relations end with "er" (taller, stronger, etc.) while others use comparative 
words instead (more careful, less wasteful, etc.) This would provide another heuristic allowing 
participants to avoid encoding relational information. 




55 University of Illinois undergraduates participated for course credit. All experimental 
sessions lasted 50 minutes or less. 
Stimuli: names and adjectives  
Arguments consisted of 438 names (219 male, 219 female) taken from a list of the 500 
most common baby names in the United States for birth year 1993 (Social Security 
Administration, n.d.) In cases of homophonic names (e.g., Megan and Meghan), duplicates were 
removed so that only one such name was used.  Names were randomly assigned to trials, such 
that each name appeared only once over the course an experimental session. This randomization 
was done anew for each participant. Relations consisted of 299 adjectives chosen by the 
experimenter on the basis that they were plausible relations with which to compare people.  
An important consideration in obtaining accurate estimates of WM capacity is the 
potential “chunkability” of to-be-learned items. To the extent that the items can be reorganized in 
terms of patterns in long-term memory, performance will yield an overestimate of WM capacity 
(Cowan, 2001). For a simple example, consider the digits, “1, 4, 9, 2, 1, 7, 7, 6”. Learning these 
digits in order does not necessarily imply a capacity of eight slots, but possibly only two, since 
they can be re-organized into two large chunks based on historical dates. This is also a potential 
issue in the present experiments. In order to claim that relational stacking is why additional role-
bindings are easier to add to an existing pair vs a new pair, I controlled for compression from 
other sources. More specifically, I took steps to prevent the compression of semantically similar 
relations into a composite relation, which would result in the appearance of encoding multiple 
two-part relational facts for a name pair when only actually encoding one.  
Suppose the to-be-learned facts are, “Roger is more strong than Burt”, “Burt is less 
aggressive than Roger”, and “Roger is more tough than Burt”. Because of the semantic similarity 
between strong, aggressive, and tough, they could be compressed into a single composite 
relation. The resulting fact might be, “Roger is more dangerous than Burt.” 
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To solve the chunkability problem, I used norms to minimize semantic similarity between 
within-trial relations. The University of South Florida free association norms (Nelson, McEvoy, 
& Schreiber, 1998) present a word and ask participants for the first word that comes to mind in 
response. For instance, after hearing “punch,” 52% of responses involved striking things with 
one’s fist. 30% of responses related to fruit punch. We assume that any words which appear as 
free associates, no matter how infrequently, are semantically similar enough to allow chunking. 
Therefore, when randomly distributing the master set of relations across trials for each 
participant, I used an automated script to ensure that within-trial relations were never free 
associates of each other. This script actually renders the example from the preceding paragraph 
impossible, since tough and strong are free associates in the norms. 
Recognition probes and distractor types 
The probe questions were composed of half “old” and half “new” items. “Old” items 
capture the exact same role-bindings expressed in a study fact, regardless of exact word order. 
For example, given the study fact, “Taylor is more studious than Jay”, either of the following 
count as the same role-bindings: an exact repetition, or “Jay is less studious than Taylor.” Four 
types of “new” items, or distractors, were constructed: “New relation” used a relation word not 
seen in the previous study phase (or, actually, in the rest of the experiment), along with a just-
seen name pair. “New arguments” used a completely new pair of names along with a just-seen 
relation. “Rebinding within proposition” reversed the meaning of a just-seen fact by swapping 
the names into each other’s relational roles. Finally, “rebinding across proposition” combined a 
just-seen name pair with one of the just-seen relations from a different pair. This last distractor 
type is potentially the most difficult or confusing, as even perfect non-relational memory of the 
items from the study facts (i.e., just knowing all the words used but without the correct role-
bindings) would be insufficient for correct guessing.  
The distractor types were designed to defeat encoding strategies aimed at simple 
recognition memory of the individual names and adjectives rather than the more complex 
relational information (i.e., role-bindings).  The laziest such strategy is to encode just the items 
themselves - only the relations, only the names, or some combination of the two. If just the 
relations are encoded, then only “new relation” probes will exceed chance performance. If just 
the names are encoded, only “new argument” probes will exceed chance. If names and relations 
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are encoded but role-bindings are not, then participants will succeed at both “new relation” and 
“new argument” probes but fail at both “rebinding within proposition” and “rebinding across 
proposition” probes. In addition to the four distractor types, I also randomly reversed name order 
in both “old” and “new” probes, rendering ineffective a strategy based only on name order in the 
study facts.  
Design and Procedure 
Participants were tested individually on computers programmed with Python 2.7 and 
PyGame. They were instructed that they would see sets of facts that relate pairs of people. They 
were told that each set of facts would be followed by a recognition query which would present a 
fact on the screen and ask if it was one they had just studied. They were to press “Y” to indicate 
“Yes, I just saw this” or “N” to indicate “No, I did not just see this.” Participants were not 
informed that the wording of a fact might change between study and test (see Experiment 1 
Discussion for more elaboration). After reading the instructions, participants began the sequence 
of 108 total trials (3 blocks of 36 trials each.) After each block, they were given a self-paced 
break. See Appendix A for the full instructions. 
 Each trial began with a self-paced study display, in which a set of two-part relational 
facts were shown in 28-pt font. This was followed by a 200-ms pattern mask of irregular 
polygons. Finally, a self-paced recognition probe appeared. The probe displayed a fact (e.g., 
“Mark is more tall than Jerry”) and the question, “Did you just see this fact? Y or N” Figure 6 
shows an example trial. 
  23 
 
Figure 6. An example trial from Experiment 1. Trials began with a self-paced study display. This 
was followed by a 500-ms pattern mask of randomly generated, irregular polygons. Finally, a 
self-paced recognition probe was shown. 
 Two factors were manipulated within subjects: the number of role-bindings (4 or 6) and 
how many unique pairs of names were related (1, 2, or 3). This results in five experimental 
conditions (the factors cannot be fully orthogonally crossed, since 3 unique pairs of items always 
require 6 role-bindings in this design). Figure 7 shows what a study trial in each case would 
entail. In a given trial, a pair of names might occur once or be repeated (e.g., Roger and Garrett 
might appear together once, twice, or three times). However, within-trial repetitions of a name 
would always be with the same partner. Additionally, a name was never repeated across multiple 
trials.  
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Figure 7. Example study displays in each condition for Experiment 1. Note: there is no condition 
with 4 role bindings and 3 name pairs, as this is impossible given the two-part relational facts 
used here. 
The main dependent variable of interest is recognition performance, measured in both 
accuracy and d-prime. The items-as-role-bindings account predicts that WM load will scale only 
with the number of role bindings in the study display. In contrast, relational stacking predicts that 
additional role bindings will also be easier to remember if they are added onto an already-used 
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pair of names, rather than onto a new pair. A secondary measure of interest is response time 
(RT). We made no specific predictions about RT, so any such analyses are exploratory. 
Bayesian Analysis 
Bayesian statistics provide several advantages over traditional null hypothesis 
significance testing (NHST). Unlike NHST, they do not suffer from the problem of alpha 
inflation when performing multiple comparisons. They handle outliers and departures from 
normality well. 
Generally, researcher actions that logically have nothing to do with the data can 
importantly influence p-values. Unintentional p-hacking (example 5 in Wagenmakers), real p-
hacking (optional stopping), etc. Bayesian analysis, however, is not affected by p-hacking and 
does not depend on the subjective intentions of the experimenter (Wagenmakers, 2007). 
Perhaps most importantly, the answers provided by Bayesian analyses, as compared to 
those from NHST, map onto the purpose of scientific experimentation more closely. A central 
goal of experimentation is to update prior beliefs in light of new evidence.  Bayesian analysis 
provides a mathematically precise and rigorous way to do so. 
If desired, Bayesian methods can be used to make binary decisions of statistical 
importance (a.k.a., “credibility”, which is analogous to “statistical reliability” in traditional 
NHST.) The Bayesian analog to a 95% confidence interval (CI) is a 95% highest density interval 
(HDI). The 95% HDI is computed from the posterior distribution, a probability density 
distribution of credible values for a parameter of interest. The 95% HDI includes the 95% most 
credible parameter values, such that any x inside the HDI is more credible than any x outside it. 
To assess whether the means of two groups are credibly different, we construct a 95% HDI of 
credible differences of group means. If zero is not included, we conclude that the group means 
are probably not the same (analogous to rejecting the null hypothesis of equal group means). 
Results 
Note: these analyses were run with both accuracy and d’ for all experiments. However, 
the choice of measure made no difference in statistical significance for any experiment. 
Therefore, for clarity all future results will be presented in terms of accuracy only. 
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Accuracy 
Bayesian posterior distributions were used to compare group mean differences in 
recognition performance. A difference between conditions was considered credible if the 95% 
HDI for difference of means was positive and did not include zero.  
Given either 4 or 6 role bindings, I predicted accuracy would improve as the number of 
name pairs decreased. For example, I predicted higher accuracy in the “4 RB, 1 pair” condition 
than the “4 RB, 2 pair” condition. The recognition data are summarized by condition in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8. Recognition accuracy by condition in Experiment 1. Error bars depict standard error 
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Four role bindings.  
As predicted, accuracy was higher in the “4 RB, 1 pair” condition (M = 86.77% correct) 
than the “4 RB, 2 pair” condition (M = 81.89% correct): 95% HDI [.01, .07], estimated Cohen’s 
d = 0.403. The estimated true difference between groups is 0.043. See Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. For Experiment 1, Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means 
(measured in accuracy) between the “4 RB, 1 pair” and “4 RB, 2 pair” conditions.  
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Six role bindings.  
As predicted, accuracy was higher in the “6 RB, 1 pair” condition (M = 84.44% correct) 
than the “6 RB, 2 pairs” condition (M = 76.67% correct): 95% HDI [.05, .105]. The estimated 
Cohen’s effect size is d = 0.758. The point estimate of true difference between groups is 0.0772.  
See Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10. For Experiment 1, Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means 
(measured in accuracy) between the “6 RB, 1 pair” and “6 RB, 2 pair” conditions.  
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However, no difference was found between “6 RB, 2 pair” (M = 76.67% correct) and “6 
RB, 3 pair” (M = 75.30% correct): 95% HDI [-.02, .05], estimated Cohen’s d = .096. The 
estimated true difference between groups is 0.135. See Figure 11. It is tempting to attribute this 
finding to a floor effect. 
 
 
Figure 11. For Experiment 1, Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means 
(measured in accuracy) between the “6 RB, 2 pair” and “6 RB, 3 pair” conditions.  
Recognition performance is also broken down by recognition probe type in Figure 12. 
Performance on all probe types was well above chance, showing that participants were sensitive 
to the relational demands of the task. 
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Figure 12. Accuracy by distractor type in Experiment 1. 
D-prime 
Bayesian posterior distributions were used to compare group mean differences in 
recognition performance. A difference between conditions was considered credible if the 95% 
HDI for difference of means was positive and did not include zero. 
Given either 4 or 6 role bindings, I predicted higher d’ (meaning higher sensitivity to 
signal over noise) as the number of name pairs decreased. For example, I predicted higher d’ in 
the “4 RB, 1 pair” condition than the “4 RB, 2 pair” condition.  
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Four role bindings.  
As predicted, d’ was higher in the “4 RB, 1 pair” condition (M = 2.16) than the “4 RB, 2 
pair” condition (M = 1.88): 95% HDI [.03, .49]. The estimated true difference between groups is 
0.267. The estimated Cohen’s d = 0.316. Figure 13 shows the Bayesian posterior distributions 
for this comparison.  
 
Figure 13. For Experiment 1, Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means 
(measured in d’) between the “4 RB, 1 pair” and “4 RB, 2 pair” conditions  
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Six role bindings.  
However, no difference was found between the “6 RB, 2 pair” (M = 1.50) and “6 RB, 3 
pair” (M = 1.47) conditions: 95% HDI [-.21, .26]. The estimated true difference between groups 
is 0.03. The estimated Cohen’s d = .019. Figure 14 shows the Bayesian posterior distributions 
for this comparison. It is tempting to attribute this finding to a floor effect. 
 
 
Figure 14. Experiment 1. Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means (measured 
in d’) between “6 RB, 2 pair” and “6 RB, 3 pair” conditions. 
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As predicted, d’ was higher in the “6 RB, 1 pair” condition (M = 1.94) than the “6 RB, 2 
pairs” condition (M = 1.50): 95% HDI [.26, .64]. The estimated Cohen’s d = 0.673. The 
estimated true difference between groups is 0.457. Figure 15 shows the Bayesian posterior 
distributions for this comparison. 
 
Figure 15. Experiment 1. Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means (measured 
in d’) between “6 RB, 1 pair” and “6 RB, 2 pair” conditions.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 served as a first step in exploring verbal relational stacking with a new 
experimental paradigm. It confirmed our main prediction, that relational role-bindings are more 
easily remembered when stacked onto an already-given pair of arguments as opposed to a new 
pair.  
I used a variety of distractor types for “new” recognition items to ensure that correct 
answers reflected encoding of the relational role-bindings rather than some other, potentially 
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simpler pattern in the study display. I predicted that such shortcuts would result in near-chance 
performance for at least one distractor type - whichever one(s) transformed the study fact in a 
way that the shortcut could not detect.  Performance for all four distractor types was well above 
chance, confirming that participants were indeed meeting the full relational demands of the task. 
However, note that participants did exceptionally well on “new relation” and “new argument” 
probes. The most likely explanation of this finding is predictable (new words should be easy to 
reject) and uninteresting from the perspective of the goals of the current work. Therefore, these 
conditions are omitted in the following experiments, which instead rely exclusively on the more 
conservative “rebinding” distractor types. 
Limitations 
 Despite the promising results of Experiment 1, follow-up studies must address several 
methodological issues, including ambiguous task instructions and potential ceiling effects. 
Participants might have been confused about what they are actually endorsing when 
responding “yes” or “no”. A “yes” response to the probe was intended to mean that the relational 
fact had the same meaning as one from the study phase, regardless of whether the two were 
stated in exactly the same words. However, some participants might have answered “yes” only 
for exact matches - the instructions were ambiguous as to this distinction. For example, imagine 
the study question, “Larry is more interesting than Roger”, and the recognition probe, “Roger is 
less interesting than Larry?” Because the wording does not match exactly, some participants 
might answer “no” (signifying a “new” item.)  
A related issue is that some “new” probe facts might have nonetheless been similar to or 
implied by facts from the study phase. For an extreme hypothetical, suppose the study fact above 
was followed by the probe fact, “Roger is more boring than Larry?” Participants might 
reasonably say “yes” in this case. Yet this would count as an incorrect answer. However, this 
scenario is a relatively minor concern: the free association norms were intended to prevent most 
such occurrences, and any that did occur would be randomly distributed between conditions and 
therefore contribute only to statistical noise. 
It was a surprise that stacking conferred only a small benefit in Experiment 1. Why might 
this be the case? As speculated in the introduction, stacking may simply be more difficult 
verbally than visually. If so, it seems unlikely that methodological changes would reliably 
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increase the size of the effect. However, the small effect could instead be simply a ceiling effect 
– after all, even with information that fits in WM with room to spare, it is unreasonable to expect 
perfect performance. Incorrect answers might still occur because of lapses in attention at either 
encoding or retrieval, motor errors when responding, fatigue, etc. Performance in the easier 
conditions is high enough that such factors plausibly explain the remaining errors. This 
conjecture will be tested in Experiment 2.  
Experiment 1 also had a potential confound: within a given number of role bindings, 
changing the number of name pairs also changed the number of items (names or relations). For 
example, I predicted better performance in the (4 RB, 1 pair) condition than the (4 RB, 2 pair) 
condition because extra role-bindings could be stacked onto the same pair of names. But an 
alternate explanation is that (4 RB, 1 pair) trials might have been easier because they had fewer 
names to recall. The design of Experiment 2 will address this confound of differing amounts of 
“stuff” between conditions. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 The second experiment includes several methodological improvements, addressing 
concerns about ceiling effects, unclear task instructions, and potential confounds. It also serves 
as a replication of the stacking effect from Experiment 1. 
I made several changes aimed at making the task harder and bringing performance off 
ceiling. Each study display now includes 8 role-bindings (four two-part relational facts), an 
increase from the 4 or 6 role-bindings (depending on condition) from Experiment 1. I also 
eliminated the empirically easier probe types -- the distractors that used new names or relations 
not shown in the study phase. Instead, both “new” (distractor) and “old” probe questions always 
consisted of names and relations just seen. This change means that simply recognizing a 
particular word as new was no longer an available clue. In order to answer correctly, participants 
actually needed to bind each name to its proper relational role.  
Experiment 2 also addresses the confound of differing amounts of “stuff” by holding 
constant the number of unique names and relations between conditions. All trials in Experiment 
2 were constructed using a set of 4 names and 4 relations. This results in a truer test of relational 
stacking, as the manipulation only affects how the items are arranged relationally but not how 
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many items in total must be maintained in working memory. Figure 16 illustrates how study 
displays in Experiment 2 are constructed in each condition. 
 
Figure 16. The two conditions in Experiment 2. The study facts always contain 8 role bindings, 
which are distributed among either four or two pairs of names. Each capital letter signifies a 
unique name, while each differently-subscripted r signifies a unique relational phrase. Note that 
regardless of name pair repetition (and thus, potential for relational stacking), both conditions 
have the same number of unique names and unique relations.  
The instructions were rewritten to address potential confusion about when to answer 
“yes” vs. “no” during probes. The changes emphasize that “yes” is the correct answer only if the 
probe question matches the exact meaning of a study fact, regardless of wording (i.e., word 
order). For example, suppose the study fact is, "Marty is less responsible than Jennifer."  If the 
probe is, "Jennifer is more responsible than Marty?", one would respond “yes”. But if the probe 
doesn’t mean exactly the same thing, the correct answer is “no”, even if it means something 
similar. For example, if the probe is “Marty is more childish than Jennifer?”, the correct response 
is “no.” See Appendix B for the full instructions used in Experiment 2. 
To further clarify the task, training trials with feedback were added to the beginning of 
the experiment. The training phrase comprised 12 training trials, each with 3 facts. To further 
ensure that participants understood the task, the feedback following incorrect answers was 
extensive. The feedback simultaneously presented the entire set of study facts, the probe 
question, and the participant’s incorrect response.  
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Methods 
Participants 
81 University of Illinois undergraduates participated for course credit. Six participants’ 
data were discarded for extreme values of performance or for not finishing the experiment. All 
experimental sessions lasted 50 minutes or less. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were like those of Experiment 1, with study displays consisting of relational 
facts comparing a pair of names. The same set of names and relations from Experiment 1 were 
randomly sampled to construct each trial. 
Design and Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1. Participants were again instructed that 
they would see sets of facts that relate pairs of people. The instructions were changed to 
emphasize that recognition queries would ask if a fact means the same thing as a fact they had 
just studied. As before, they were to press “Y” to indicate “Yes” or “N” to indicate “No.”  
After reading the instructions, participants began the training phase (4 trials). This was 
followed by 80 actual trials (12 blocks of 8 trials each.) Breaks were given at completion of the 
training phase and after blocks 4 and 7 of the actual trials. Participants were allowed to rest for as 
long as they wished during each break. 
 The structure of each trial matched that of Experiment 1. Each trial began with a self-
paced study display, in which a set of two-part relational facts were shown in 28-pt font. This 
was followed by a 200-ms pattern mask of irregular polygons. Finally, a self-paced recognition 
probe appeared. The probe displayed a fact (e.g., “Mark is more tall than Jerry”) and the 
question, “Was this true? Y or N”. 
 One factor was manipulated within-subjects: how many unique pairs of names were 
related (2 or 4). The number of role-bindings was held constant: both conditions had 8 role-
bindings (four 2-part relational facts). This results in just two experimental conditions. 
I used the same dependent measures and made the same predictions as in Experiment 1. 
The main dependent variable of interest is recognition performance, measured in accuracy. The 
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items-as-role-bindings account predicts that WM load will scale only with the number of role 
bindings in the study display. In contrast, relational stacking predicts that additional role 
bindings will also be easier to remember if they are added onto an already-used pair of names, 
rather than onto a new pair. A secondary measure of interest is response time (RT). 
Results 
Bayesian posterior distributions were again used to compare group mean differences in 
recognition performance. A difference between conditions was considered credible if the 95% 
HDI for difference of means was positive and did not include zero. 
Accuracy 
The recognition data are summarized by condition in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Recognition performance (accuracy) in Experiment 2 by condition. The outside of the 
violin plot shows kernel density estimations of the underlying distributions. Inside each violin, a 
boxplot shows the group mean as a white dot and the inter-quartile range as a thick line portion.  
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Given 8 role bindings, I predicted accuracy would improve as the number of name pairs 
decreased. In particular, there should be higher accuracy in the “8 RB, 2 pair” condition than the 
“8 RB, 4 pair” condition.  
In brief, this is exactly what I found. As predicted, accuracy was higher in the “8 RB, 2 
pair” condition (M = 73.3% correct) than the “8 RB, 4 pair” condition (M = 62.1% correct): 95% 
HDI [.09, .13]. The estimated Cohen’s d = 1.23. The estimated true difference between groups is 
0.11. Figure 18 shows the Bayesian posterior distributions for this comparison.  
 
Figure 18. Experiment 2: Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means (measured 
in accuracy) between “8 RB, 2 pair” and “8 RB, 4 pair” conditions. We predicted the mean 
difference would be positive, denoting better performance in “8 RB, 2 pair”. This was indeed the 
case. We conclude that the group means truly are different because zero is not included in the 
95% highest density interval (HDI). The estimated true difference between group means is 0.11. 
The inequalities in green text show the percentage of credible parameter values that fall on 
either side of 0. For example, in the upper left panel, no credible values are less than 0, while 
fully 100% of credible values are greater than 0.  
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Discussion 
Experiment 2 shows that the results of Experiment 1 were not a fluke by replicating the 
effect of cognitive relational stacking: that additional role bindings are easier to remember when 
added to an already-given name pair as opposed to a new name pair. Importantly, the effect was 
shown after enacting several methodological improvements: first, task ambiguity was reduced 
with re-written instructions and the addition of a training phase. Next, a potential alternative 
explanation was eliminated with tighter experimental controls. Finally, power was increased by 
eliminating theoretically extraneous conditions and probe types, increasing the number of within-
subject trials that directly tested our hypothesis. These improvements may be responsible for the 
even larger effect obtained in Experiment 2. 
Now that a relational stacking effect with verbal materials has been established, several 
questions remain about how this form of compression works. If we take the stacking account 
literally, items in WM are a set of objects compared on one or more relations. Thus, the answer 
to “What can be stacked?” is role-bindings. The answer to, “What can they be stacked onto?” is 
existing object pairs. Other types of repeated relational information, in contrast, should not stack.  
  
  41 
CHAPTER 3: WHAT COUNTS AS AN ITEM IN VERBAL RELATIONAL 
STACKING? 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 is motivated by the theoretical claim that simply repeating certain items 
(and therefore having less “stuff” to remember) is not what drives the compression effect of 
relational stacking. The hook on which stacking occurs is a repeated pair of items (in this case, 
people) that are used in multiple relational facts. In contrast, repeating other types of things 
should not yield useful compression. Therefore, repeating a pair of names should help, but 
repeating a relation should not. 
There is theoretical justification, beyond stacking’s assertion of what counts as an item in 
WM, that repeating name pairs will yield useful compression while repeating other items (i.e., 
relations) will not. In particular, stacking based on repeated pairs should preserve all of the 
original information, such that unpacking results in the correct, unambiguous, original role 
bindings. For example, given the facts “Johnny is more angry than Rick” and “Johnny is less 
trusting than Rick”, one’s WM could stack like so: more-angry, less-trusting (Johnny, Rick). On 
the other hand, if relations are repeated, it does not seem possible for compression to take place 
in a way that unambiguously preserves the original role bindings. For example, given the facts 
“Johnny is more angry than Rick” and “Tessa is less angry than Bob”, one could try to “stack” 
the names onto the repeated relation: more-angry (Johnny, Rick, Tessa, Bob). The problem is 
that much original information is lost – which names were paired together? In each pair, which 
name was bound to the more-angry and which to the less-angry roles? 
This experiment served as a replication of the main stacking effect while testing a 
prediction of no benefit (i.e., a null result) when relations are repeated. I varied the type of 
information that is repeated within a trial, while holding constant the number of role-bindings 
between conditions.  
The repeat-pairs condition used a name pair multiple times within a trial. This is 
essentially the relational stacking condition -- just as in Experiments 1 and 2, additional role 
bindings should be easier to remember when they are added to an already-encoded name pair. 
The repeat-relations condition used a relation multiple times within a trial, but never repeated a 
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name pair. The repeat nothing condition used different names and relations in each study fact and 
thus served as a control condition. 
Methods 
Participants 
64 University of Illinois undergraduates participated for course credit. All experimental 
sessions lasted 50 minutes or less. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were like those of Experiment 1, with study displays consisting of relational 
facts comparing pairs of names. The same set of names and relations from Experiments 1 and 2 
were randomly sampled to construct each trial. 
Design and Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 2. The stimulus display logic, font size, 
etc. were the same as Experiment 2.  
After reading the instructions, participants began the training phase (12 trials).  This was 
followed by 96 actual trials (12 blocks of 8 trials each.) Self-paced breaks were given at 
completion of the training phase and after blocks 4 and 7 of the actual trials. 
 I manipulated the type of information repeated across multiple relational facts: name 
pairs, relations, or nothing (control condition). This within-subjects manipulation results in three 
experimental conditions. The number of role-bindings was held constant: all conditions had 8 
role-bindings (four 2-part relational facts). Error! Reference source not found. illustrates how 





Figure 19. The three conditions from Experiment 3. Either name pairs, relations, or nothing (control condition) were 
repeated within a trial. The study facts always contained 8 role bindings. Each capital letter signifies a unique name, while 
each differently-subscripted r signifies a unique relational phrase. Note that regardless of what is repeated, both the “name 
pairs” and “relations” conditions use the same number of repetitions – two instances of the same thing. 
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As in Experiments 1 and 2, the main dependent variable of interest is recognition 
performance as measured in accuracy. Relational stacking predicts that role bindings will be 
easier to remember if they are added onto an already-used pair of names, rather than onto a new 
pair (repeat-none). In contrast, an account that predicts a benefit repetition of any kind, 
regardless of relational syntax, would therefore predict a benefit of both repeating names and 
repeating relations, relative to the repeat-none control condition. The repeat none condition 
served as a control group. A secondary measure of interest is response time (RT). 
Results 
The present data are difficult to interpret because of both large variations in participant 
response time and apparent floor effects (explained in more detail below). I will avoid the 
problem of researcher degrees of freedom by remaining agnostic about the reliability of these 
data. However, the following analyses are presented (with reservations) for clues as to the design 
of the next experiment. 
Response Times 
Of 64 participants, 16 (25%) did not complete the experiment. The distribution of 
response times (RTs) showed strong positive skew. 13 participants (20.3%) showed mean study 
RTs of 19 seconds or greater. Participants who finished, as compared with those who didn’t, 
might have differed in some meaningful way: two such possibilities are presented here. 
The slow performance by non-finishers could be evidence that these participants used 
qualitatively different memory strategies or processes (e.g., LTM and mnemonics). Long study 
times are a prerequisite for forming new chunks, and indeed one way to prevent chunking is to 
introduce task demands that constrain the time available to respond (Cowan, 2004). 
Unfortunately, it is hard to explore this possibility with these data since they include no on-line 
measures of what participants are doing during the task (this will be addressed in Experiment 5).  
Another possibility is that non-finishers put in significantly more effort than the other 
participants: the data show a classic speed-accuracy tradeoff. Non-finishers spent more time on 
each study display than finishers (M = 25.72 s and 9.76 s, respectively). Non-finishers also took 
longer to answer recognition probes (M = 4.55 s and 2.23 s, respectively.) Perhaps as a result, 
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non-finishers showed higher overall accuracy (M = 68.9% correct) than finishers (M = 62.8% 
correct). 
Accuracy 
Analyses performed with and without nonfinishers give the same result, so the separate 
analyses are not reported here. 
Given 8 role bindings, I predicted accuracy would be higher for repeated name pairs than 
for repeating nothing (control condition.) However, I predicted no benefit to accuracy (a null 
result) for repeated relations. Finally, I predicted higher accuracy for repeated names than for 
repeated relations.  
In brief, none of the planned comparisons were significant at the 95% confidence 
criterion. Taken at face value, the results suggest no memory benefit regardless of what kind of 
item is repeated. The recognition data are summarized by condition in .  
Accuracy was the same in the “repeat name pairs” condition (M = 68.3% correct) and the 
“repeat nothing” condition (M = 59.6% correct): 95% HDI [-.056, .176]. The estimated Cohen’s 
d = .0525. The estimated true difference between groups is 0.0591.  Figure 21 shows the 
Bayesian posterior distributions for this comparison. 
Accuracy was also the same in the “repeat relations” condition (M = 66.4% correct) and 
the “repeat nothing” condition (M = 59.6% correct): 95% HDI [-.0573, .169]. The estimated 
Cohen’s d = .0642. The estimated true difference between groups is 0.0578. Figure 22 shows the 
Bayesian posterior distributions for this comparison. 
Finally, accuracy was again the same in the “repeat name pairs” condition (M = 68.3% 
correct) and the “repeat relations” condition (M = 66.4% correct): 95% HDI [-.0523, .176]. The 
estimated Cohen’s d = .0467. The estimated true difference between groups is 0.0586. Figure 23 




Figure 20. Experiment 3. Recognition accuracy by condition (repeat nothing, repeat names, 




Figure 21. Experiment 3: Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means (measured 





Figure 22. Experiment 3: Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means (measured 






Figure 23. Experiment 3: Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means (measured 





Experiment 3 was designed to build on our understanding of relational stacking by testing 
the prediction that syntax matters in enabling the effect. Specifically, stacking is not attained by 
just any repetition, but the repetition of a name pair onto which additional role bindings are 
added. In contrast, I did not expect a benefit to repeating relations across unique name pairs.  
However, these predictions were not borne out by the data. In fact, the data failed even to 
replicate the basic stacking effect – repeating name pairs provided no benefit compared to the 
control condition. Yet two issues are apparent that make it difficult to interpret these data. 
One concern is that 25% of participants failed to finish the experiment. This is reflected 
by the response time (RT) distributions at both study and recognition probe, which show a strong 
positive skew. Potential explanations include qualitatively different memory strategies, pre-
existing individual differences, or other inequalities between slower participants and the rest. 
Alternatively, the high proportion of slow responders may suggest that the experiment in its 
present form does not provide enough incentives to stay on-task. These aspects of the RT 
distributions are concerning a priori, even before looking at the accuracy data.  
Another issue is that floor effects may have obscured the true differences between 
conditions. Even participants who spent inordinate amounts of time per question did not perform 
very impressively – non-finishers showed a grand mean (collapsed across conditions) of 68.9% 
correct. The remaining participants did even worse at 62.8% correct.  
The most surprising outcome is that the basic stacking effect failed to replicate here. The 
effect has been otherwise reliable – it has appeared in each of the other experiments so far. The 
null result is especially puzzling given that the two critical conditions of the present experiment – 
“repeat names” and “repeat nothing” – are identical to Experiment 2’s “8 RB, 2 name pairs” and 
“8 RB, 4 name pairs”. Yet the previous experiment showed a large effect by the standards of 
cognitive psychology (Cohen’s d = 1.23), while Experiment 3 showed a nonsignificant, quite 
small effect (Cohen’s d  = 0.05).  
Some of these claims are contradictory, and I do not want to err on the side of rampant 
researcher degrees of freedom when drawing theoretical conclusions. The safe bet is to repeat 
these experiments so that interpretation does not rely on messy data. Because follow-up 





Experiment 4 was simply a replication of Experiment 3 but with one major change: 
subjects were paid for correct responses to motivate them to both complete the experiment and 
perform to the best of their ability. A relatively minor change was the reduction of each study 
display from eight role-bindings to six in order to bring performance off the floor (see Figure 
24.) 
Participants were paid a guaranteed minimum for participation but could earn bonus 
payments for each question correct past a certain threshold. The instructions and training trials 
were changed to reflect the payment scheme. Each trial was followed by feedback that included 
the bonus payments earned so far.  
 
 
Figure 24. The three conditions from Experiment 4. Either name pairs, relations, or nothing 
(control condition) were repeated within a trial. The study facts always contained 6 role 
bindings. Each capital letter signifies a unique name. Each differently-subscripted r signifies a 
unique relational phrase. Note that regardless of what is repeated, both the “name pairs” and 






50 University of Illinois undergraduates were recruited from the paid subject pool. One 
participant’s data was excluded for failure to follow instructions. Participants were paid a 
guaranteed minimum of $8, but could earn extra money on a sliding scale (explained below) 
based on the number of correctly answered recognition questions. All experimental sessions 
lasted 50 minutes or less. 
Design and Procedure 
The minimum possible payment was $8. The maximum possible payment was $15.32. 
The average payment was $9.88. 
The stimulus display procedure was the same as in Experiment 3. The differences 
included incentive payments, instructions explaining incentive payments, and a display after 
each trial of both the total of payment earned and the percent of correctly answered questions. 
After reading the instructions, participants began the training phase (6 trials). Next followed the 
sequence of 120 total trials (10 blocks of 12 trials each.) After blocks 4 and 7, participants were 
given self-paced breaks. The instructions began:  
 
There will be 120 questions in total. Starting when you've answered 60 questions 
correctly, you will get bonus payments for every additional question you answer 
correctly. And as you get more and more questions correct, the bonus payment per 
question will increase. 
 
Once past the threshold of 60 questions correct (50% of all trials), extra payment was 
earned for each additional correct answer. Initially (i.e., on the first trial after 60 correct 
answers), participants were paid $0.05 per correct answer. Payments per correct answer 
increased after each additional 12 correct answers. For example, after 12 additional correct 
answers (i.e., 72 total correct answers), payment increased to $0.07 per correct answer. The 
complete payment increase schedule was as follows: 60 correct, $0.05; 72 correct, $0.07; 84 
correct, $0.09; 96 correct, $0.15; 108 correct, $0.25. With 120 total trials, a subject who got 
every single trial correct could make $15.32 ($8 baseline pay plus $7.32 in bonus payments). It 
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was emphasized that in order to maximize payment, participants should strive to be both fast and 
accurate. The complete instructions regarding payment are shown in Appendices C and D. 
Several messages intended to increase participant motivation could potentially appear 
after each trial. First, every trial was followed by a running total of both the number and the 
percentage of correctly answered questions. When approaching the next threshold for increased 
bonus payments, the message was, “Only 5 more trials until a pay increase!” When the next 
threshold was reached, the message was, “Congratulations! You've entered a BONUS round. 
You will now receive ___ cents for each correct answer.” 
Results 
Design changes 
Before presenting results theoretically relevant to the stacking hypotheses, I will examine 
the data to see whether the changes in recruitment and compensation led to more reasonable 
response patterns. 
Figure 25 compares participants’ mean response times (RTs) at study between 
Experiments 3 and 4. The central tendency remains nearly unchanged in Experiment 4 (M = 11.9 
s) compared to Experiment 3 (M = 12.1 s). However, the RTs are far less variable in Experiment 
4 (SD = 4.64, compared to SD = 11.56). This narrowing comes mostly from the absence of very 
high study times, but the floor of the RTs has also been raised. The narrowed RT from both 
directions was expected based on the new incentive structure, which encouraged a balance – 
move too quickly, and subjects might answer incorrectly and miss a payment; but move too 
slowly, and they might not answer enough questions to receive more payments. Indeed, Figure 
26, a violin plot of the same RT distributions from Experiments 4 and 5, provides an even clearer 
graphical demonstration of the reduced variability observed in Experiment 4.  
Not surprisingly, the completion rate was higher in Experiment 4 (87.8%) than 
Experiment 3 (75%). There was also an improvement in per-subject overall accuracy (collapsed 
across condition): Experiment 4 (M = 73.7%) showed higher accuracy than Experiment 3 (M = 
64.7%).  
In summary, the design changes seem to have succeeded, leading to responses that were 
both faster and more accurate than the previous study. The good overall performance alleviates 
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concerns that participants were unmotivated or overwhelmed by task demands. The faster 
responses address that same concern while also far reducing the chances that participants were 










Figure 26. Response time (RT) at study for Experiments 3 and 4. Violin plots show that the 
distributions have similar central tendencies (M = 11.9 s and 12.1 s, respectively). But 





The recognition data are summarized by condition in Error! Reference source not 
found.. 
As predicted by the stacking account, accuracy was greater in the “repeat name pairs” 
condition (M = 77.0 % correct) than the “repeat nothing” condition (M = 71.1% correct): 95% 
HDI [.025, .094]. The estimated Cohen’s d = .0449. The estimated true difference between 
groups is 0.0578. Error! Reference source not found. shows the Bayesian posterior 
distributions for this comparison. 
Also as predicted by the stacking account, accuracy was the same in the “repeat 
relations” condition (M = 73.1% correct) and the control “repeat nothing” condition (M = 71.1% 
correct): 95% HDI [-.0235, .0558]. The estimated Cohen’s d = .109. The estimated true 
difference between groups is 0.0177. Error! Reference source not found. shows the Bayesian 
posterior distributions for this comparison. 
Finally, as predicted, accuracy was greater in the “repeat name pairs” condition (M = 77.0 
% correct) than the “repeat relations” condition (M = 73.1% correct): 95% HDI [.005, .068]. The 
estimated Cohen’s d = .345. The estimated true difference between groups is 0.0364. Error! 














Figure 28. Experiment 4: Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means (measured in 




Figure 29. Experiment 4: Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means (measured 




Figure 30. Experiment 4: Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means (measured 




Experiment 4 was designed to build on our understanding of relational stacking by testing 
the prediction that syntax matters in enabling the effect. Specifically, stacking is not attained by 
just any repetition, but the repetition of a name pair onto which additional role bindings are 
added. This prediction was borne out, as was the lack of benefit for repeating relations across 
unique name pairs.  
Repeated relations have failed to provide a benefit in two very different experiments – 
Experiment 3, with its failed replication of the previously reliable stacking effect and its unusual 
RT properties – and Experiment 4, with its payment incentives. This may still be surprising 
given the well-established role of phonological duration in non-relational WM capacity. It 
remains possible that some relational tasks would benefit from both a stacking effect and a 
phonologically-based boost for repeated items of other types.  
However, given the consistent null results so far, the relational demands of the present 
studies may change how repetition affects memory. Any benefit of word repetition may be 
outweighed by interference induced by repeating relations specifically. Anecdotally, reports from 
pilot participants as well as my own experience is that repeat relation trials feel very difficult. It's 
hard to keep straight which names are linked together and which people are bound to which 
relational role. The subjective difficulty matches the theoretical account that trying to stack on 
repeated relations should lead to ambiguous or incorrect representations. 
The experiments thus far have established a reliable effect of relational stacking in the 
cognitive domain. Additional facts are better remembered when they consist of extra role-
bindings added onto an already-encoded name pair already in WM. On the other hand, there 
seems to be no benefit for within-trial repetitions of the other major item type, the relations 
themselves. The next experiment moves on to address the possibility that LTM, and in particular 






CHAPTER 4: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF LONG-TERM MEMORY IN 
VERBAL RELATIONAL STACKING 
EXPERIMENT 5 
An alternative explanation for the results of Experiments 1 through 4 is that the observed 
effects do not reflect relational stacking (as predicted here) but instead reflect traditional 
chunking à la Miller (1956). Although I explicitly tried to control for this possibility by 
restricting within-trial relations based on associative norms, it is always possible that subjects 
found some way to link relations together into meaningful structures and store those structures 
not in WM (as predicted by the relational stacking hypothesis) but instead in LTM.  
Although I took great care to prevent LTM-based regularities that would allow these 
strategies, there are still more opportunities to relate multiple relations when they share 
arguments. Two obvious ways to accomplish stacking via LTM are to 1) compress or chunk 
semantically similar relations into a smaller number of composite relations (i.e., that for which I 
tried to control with the associative norms), or 2) create an explanation or story that links 
multiple relations into a coherent structure.  
As such, relations with repeated arguments could allow participants to form a “chunk” 
(i.e., a story), that can be stored in LTM in a way that presenting the same relations with non-
overlapping arguments does not. For example, suppose the relations used are “more careful” and 
“more brutish”. Told that “Carl is more brutish than Sarah” and “Sarah is more careful than 
Carl”, it is easier to integrate those facts into a story than if you are told, “Carl is more brutish 
than Sarah” and “Bill is more careful than Jake.” (Stories are strings of connected facts about the 
same people so repeating people i.e., arguments, makes it possible to form stories, in a way that 
using unique argument pairs doesn’t.)  
One way to address this issue is to further refine our experimental paradigm such that 
opportunities for WM-only stacking (i.e., repetition of name pairs) are no longer confounded 
with opportunities for LTM-based strategies. However, short of replacing both names and 
relation words with meaningless nonsense syllables, it is not clear how this could be 
accomplished. In fact, even such drastic measures might be impotent to prevent the explanations, 
inferences, and other impositions of meaning in which people routinely engage.  
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The purpose of Experiment 5 is to disentangle these two potential explanations for the 
relational stacking effect. Namely, does relational stacking depend simply on how the items are 
arranged (i.e., repeating a set of arguments across multiple relations?) I will call this the “syntax-
only” hypothesis. Or does relational stacking depend also on LTM-based connections (e.g., 
semantic or thematic similarity) between the relations added to a repeated set of arguments? I 
will call this the “syntax-plus-LTM” hypothesis. Note the implication in name choice for the 
latter hypothesis – if true, relational stacking still requires a certain syntax. 
Given the futility of completely preventing LTM-based strategies, for Experiment 5 I 
instead chose to turn this bug into a feature. Rather than trying to prevent such strategies, I first 
assessed the extent to which they were used spontaneously and then encouraged them. Two 
insights are relevant to this design choice. First, LTM-based strategies should be available to 
conscious awareness: they are the result of extended and deliberate thought. Thus, participant 
self-report via written surveys should reveal their use. Second, even if these strategies are not 
used spontaneously, they might be encouraged by tipping off participants as to their existence 
and how to use them effectively. 
The first half of the experiment proceeds with the basic design as before, testing 
recognition memory for relational facts with varying numbers of repeated name pairs. However, 
after half of the trials are complete, participants are given a survey that begins with open-ended 
questions about which, if any, mnemonic strategies have been used so far. These initial questions 
are open-ended so as not to influence participants: The intention is to avoid inspiring or 
suggesting particular mnemonic approaches, but instead to assess their use. The remaining 
survey questions “tip off” participants, introducing explanation or chunking as potentially useful 
strategies. Participants are then asked whether and how often those specific strategies were used. 
Finally, a post-experiment survey attempts to detect changes in strategy use following the mid-
experiment survey. 
 If the “syntax-plus-LTM” hypothesis is correct, a stacking effect (similar to previous 
experiments) should be predicted by survey responses that acknowledge LTM-based strategies. 
Additionally, even if such strategies are being used inconsistently or incompletely, the tipoff 
might increase their usage. Thus, the tipoff should magnify the chances of observing an effect if 
it exists. The post-experiment survey results may give an idea of how effectively the tipoff 
manipulation changed subject behavior.  
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If the “syntax-only” hypothesis is correct, then the usual stacking effect should be 
unchanged with the frequency of LTM-based strategies in either survey. If true, I can be even 
more confident that this experimental paradigm is sufficient to discourage or prevent LTM 
strategies.  
Finally, both hypotheses may be correct – repeated names may benefit memory by 
syntax, and an additional benefit may come from recruiting traditional chunking into that 
relational structure. This would suggest a direction for future experiments: explaining how and 
when syntax-based vs LTM-based compression are used in relational stacking. Nearly any result 
in this experiment would be interesting and tell us something about how stacking is 
accomplished. 
Methods 
Experiment 5 tests stacking in the same way as previous experiments – the number of 
repeated name pairs are varied while the number of role bindings are held constant. The only 
significant additions were the mid- and post-experiment surveys. This results in one independent 
variable with two factors, name pairs (2 vs 4); and one covariate, subject ratings of how often 
they used explanation or storytelling to tie together relations on a repeated name pair. Subjects 
made this rating twice, corresponding to strategy use in the first and second halves of the 
experiment.  
Appendices E and F contain the full mid-experiment and post-experiment surveys. 
Participants 
41 University of Illinois undergraduates participated for course credit. One participant’s 
data was discarded for extremely high response times. All experimental sessions lasted 50 
minutes or less. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were like those of Experiments 1 through 4, with study displays consisting of 
relational facts comparing pairs of names. The same set of names and relations from the previous 
studies were randomly sampled to construct each trial. 
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Design and Procedure 
The procedure was similar to those of the previous experiments. The stimulus display 
logic, font size, etc. were the same as Experiments 1 through 4.  
After reading the instructions, participants began the training phase (4 trials).  This was 
followed by 80 actual trials (10 blocks of 8 trials each.) Self-paced breaks were given at 
completion of the training phase and after blocks 4 and 7 of the actual trials. 
  One factor was manipulated within-subjects: how many unique pairs of names were 
related (2 or 4). The number of role bindings was held constant at 8 (four two-part relational 
facts). An additional covariate was subjects’ ratings on a 1-5 Likert scale of how often they used 
chunking-like strategies, such as explanation or storytelling. These ratings were made twice, 
corresponding to strategy use in the 1st and 2nd halves of the experiment (pre- and post-tipoff). As 
before, the main dependent variable of interest is recognition performance as measured in 
accuracy.  
Probe recognition questions again consisted of 50% old and 50% new items, with new 
items (distractors) taking the form of either rebinding-within-proposition or rebinding-across-
proposition.  
Linear mixed models 
Originally, I proposed that change in LTM-strategy frequency from pre- to post-tipoff be 
used as a predictor and the simultaneous change between first and second half performance be 
used as the outcome variable. However, linear mixed models have since been chosen for this 
analysis. Given this modeling procedure (which will be explained in detail below), the more 
appropriate operationalization uses the raw values of the strategy ratings as a predictor and the 
raw accuracy values as the outcome. This actually allows a more straightforward test of the roles 
of relational syntax and LTM – the original set of decision rules that mapped various outcomes 
on a change DV to various theoretical interpretations was just a complicated way to approximate 




I used R (R Core Team, 2016) and lme4 (Bates, Maechler & Bolker, 2015) to perform a 
linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship between accuracy, condition, and subjects’ 
ratings of how often LTM-based strategies were used (from here on, abbreviated ltm). Mixed 
models are used rather than traditional linear models because they account for the nested 
structure (and non-independence) of observations in within-subjects designs. They are also 
advantageous because they allow estimation of not only fixed effects but also those that vary 
randomly between members of a grouping variable – for example, by allowing each subject to 
have their own slope of condition (2 vs 4 name pairs) vs accuracy -- in addition to the overall 
fixed component. Modeling this random effect structure allows for greater power, yet negligible 
change in Type I error rate, compared to traditional approaches like ANOVA (Barr et al., 2013). 
I used likelihood ratio tests to obtain P-values for each additional predictor added to an 
initial null model. Likelihood ratio tests compare the fit of a full model (with the effect in 
question) against that of a reduced or null model without the effect in question. The resulting P-
values are based on the chi-squared test (see Winter, 2013 for a tutorial on hypothesis testing in 
linear mixed models and Bolker et al., 2009, for a broad overview of different approaches). 
These choices of statistical techniques and modeling procedures were made before looking at 
either the survey or recognition accuracy data. 
Results 
Accuracy 
Given 8 role bindings, I predicted accuracy would improve as the number of name pairs 
decreased. In particular, accuracy should be greater for “8 RB, 2 pairs” than for “8 RB, 4 pairs”.  
The recognition data are summarized by condition in Figure 31. As predicted, accuracy 
was greater with 2 name pairs (M = 72.1% correct) than with 4 name pairs (M = 63.6% correct): 
95% HDI [.04, .13]. The estimated Cohen’s d = 0.70. The estimated true difference between 






Figure 31. Experiment 5. Violin plot of recognition accuracy by condition (two vs four name 
pairs). Accuracy was greater with 2 name pairs (M = 72.1% correct) than with 4 name pairs (M 




Figure 32. Experiment 5: Bayesian posterior distributions for the difference of means (measured 
in accuracy) between “8 RB, 2 pair” and “8 RB, 4 pair” conditions. I predicted the mean 
difference would be positive, denoting better performance for two name pairs. This was indeed 
the case. I conclude that the group means truly are different because zero is not included in the 
95% highest density interval (HDI). The inequalities in green text show the percentage of 
credible parameter values that fall on either side of 0. For example, in the upper left distribution, 




Survey – self-reported memory strategies 
Participants reported a variety of strategies that could be broadly classified as WM-based 
or LTM-based. Many participants reported use of multiple strategies at once. Another common 
feature was switching strategies depending on either trial difficulty or the presence of name pair 
repetitions. WM-based strategies included rote rehearsal (n = 2), verbal compression to make the 
words quicker to say (n = 3), learning only the initials of the names or relations (n = 5), and 
ignoring some words altogether to reduce memory load – e.g., ignoring the relations or ignoring 
the names (n = 4). LTM-based strategies included making up stories or explanations that tie 
together relations on a repeated pair (n = 8) or drawing connections between stimulus names and 
real-life people known by participants (n = 5).  
No inferential statistics or modeling were performed on these qualitative data because the 
cell counts are too small, and often the strategies too poorly described, to glean anything 
statistically reliable. In many cases, subjects’ descriptions were vague or difficult to follow, 
which made classifying the strategies impossible. For example, seven participants reported 
“grouping together similar things”, which is not specific enough to classify. 
 
Survey – modeling stacking effect vs self-reports of LTM strategy frequency 
Linear mixed effects analysis was used to address the novel prediction that, if the 
relational stacking effect depends on LTM-based strategy use, then there should be an interaction 
between the stacking effect and participant self-reports of how often they used such strategies. 
The latter measure is rated on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 and will be abbreviated ltm in the model. 
Nine participants were excluded from this analysis only because their answers were 
unintelligible, not relevant to the question, or were inconsistent to such a degree that they seemed 
to be invalid measures of their LTM strategy use. For example, in response to the open-ended 
tip-off question, some participants claimed to have never used any sort of chunking or 
explanation – then, in the very next question (ltm), rated their frequency as 5 out of 5, meaning 
“always or almost always” (n = 5). One participant rated the frequency as 6 out of 5. Note that all 
of these participants are still included in the Bayesian analysis of accuracy by condition, for 
which having an accurate description of mnemonic strategies is irrelevant. 
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The first predictor of interest is condition (2 vs 4 name pairs). The stacking account 
predicts that, given the number of role-bindings were held constant, accuracy should improve 
with fewer name pairs. Although condition has already been confirmed as significant by the 
previous Bayesian analysis, it is tested again here both as a “sanity check” (we expect it to be 
significant again here) and to follow the best practice of verifying each new predictor added to a 
model before allowing the model to grow further (Barr et al., 2013).  
As a baseline to test additional predictors, I began with a null model, which included no 
systematic (fixed) effects of interest. The null model used only random effects – random 
intercept by subject and random slope on condition by subject. (Although it may seem odd that a 
“null” model includes multiple effects, simulation results by Barr et al., 2013, show that starting 
with the maximal random effects structure justified by your design leads to both highest power 
and lowest Type I error rate). No “by item” random effects were specified because any definition 
of item in the present data – whether it be a full relational fact, a pair of names, etc. – entails a 
near-infinite number of levels (and thus free parameters).  
To test condition, the null model was compared to a full model with the added fixed 
effect of condition. The full model including condition was a better fit (χ2 (1) = 11.95, p < .001), 
with the change from two to four name pairs lowering accuracy by about 0.097 ± 0.025.  
The next model tested a fixed main effect of ltm – that frequency of LTM-based strategy 
use affects performance in general, regardless of number of name pairs. A full model including 
fixed effects of both condition and ltm was compared to the previous model with a fixed effect of 
condition. The full model including ltm was a better fit (χ2 (1) = 5.57, p = .018), with an increase 
in ltm improving accuracy by about 0.026 ± 0.011. 
Finally, I tested the central question of interest: does the stacking effect depend on LTM-
based strategies? (In model terms: is there an interaction between condition and ltm on 
accuracy?) For this comparison, the full model included the original random effects from the null 
model, the fixed effects of condition and ltm, and a fixed interaction effect of condition and ltm. 
This was compared to a reduced model without the interaction effect. The interaction term did 




Experiment 5 aimed to figure out if long-term memory systems or strategies play a role in 
the stacking effect. More generally, it was a first attempt at exploring the strategies that 
participants use spontaneously when tasked to remember written relational facts. Finally, it 
included another test of the basic stacking effect, in which additional facts are easier to 
remember when they relate an already-given pair of names. 
The data showed a successful replication of the stacking effect – given a set of eight role-
bindings, recognition accuracy was higher when multiple facts related the same pair of people (2 
name pairs) vs when each fact related a different pair of people (4 name pairs). However, the 
effect did not depend on how often participants made use of chunking, storytelling or other 
related strategies.  
The results as a whole support the “syntax-only” hypothesis, which describes relational 
stacking as a phenomenon of WM. On this account, extra role bindings can be added to a name 
pair without supplying LTM-based meaning or cohesion to “glue” the names together. Stacking 
is thus differentiated from traditional chunking, which does require knowledge or previous 
experience.  
However, this design was only an exploratory first attempt at specifying the memory 
systems and processes underlying stacking. The experiment had several limitations. For example, 
the diversity and messiness of survey responses give reason to be cautious about ruling out LTM. 
Participants may have used other strategies that could credibly be classified as LTM/chunking, 
but either omitted them or, when faced with the survey, failed to recognize them as “explanation 
or storytelling” per se. Motivation may have also played a role in the often sparse or vague 
strategy descriptions. The incentives of post-experiment surveys are at odds with comprehensive 
and thoughtful answers: the sooner subjects finish writing, the sooner they are allowed to leave.  
 More generally, it is unclear how much we should trust the retrospective survey 
responses. Memorial errors of omission or commission are a concern. It would not be surprising, 
for example, if self-reports of strategy use were sensitive to the classic serial position curve, and 
thus consisted largely of the most recent or even initial strategies. Likewise, survey responses 
might overrepresent the most unique or engaging strategies. Reports might even be biased, in 
some cases, towards the most boring strategies: if a participant categorizes the whole experience 
72 
 
as “boring psychology experiment that I don’t want to do,” then an especially tedious or difficult 
question seems like an obvious prototype for retrieval during the later survey.  
To obtain more accurate descriptions of the memorization process for relational facts, we 
might borrow design ideas from research on depth of processing (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975; 
Symons & Thompson, 1997). These experiments find that memory for lists of words depends on 
how the words are processed. Considering a word's meaning leads to better memory than 
considering its sound (although this effect reverses when the later test uses sound-based retrieval 
cues). But critically, the various ways of processing don't happen on their own. Instead, each 
word is paired with an orienting question which can only be answered by doing the intended 
processing. For example, given the word bed, the meaning condition might ask, "Does the word 
fit in the following sentence: He saw a ______ on the street”? The sound condition might ask, 
"Does this word rhyme with cloud?"  
An analog in the stacking paradigm could go as follows. Suppose the trial facts are "Pat is 
more quiet than Ryan" and "Ryan is less scholarly than Pat." We could suggest a meaning-based 
strategy by asking, "Do you think it's likely that... Pat is also more agreeable than Ryan?" To 
suggest an explanatory strategy, we might ask, "Why is the more quiet person also more 
scholarly?" To suggest a shallow or relatively meaningless strategy, analogous to rhyme in the 
depth of processing studies, we could ask, "Which name has the most letters?" To suggest 
compressing the facts in a purely verbal or phonological sense, we could ask, "Which of these 
acronyms match the study facts?", with the correct answer being "PmqR, RlsP". This kind of 
manipulation may be a more straightforward test of how study strategy impacts the memory 
benefit of repeating names or other words. 
Two other broad changes might lead to more accurate strategy descriptions in relational 
stacking tasks. First, rather than retrospective surveys, on-line or relatively immediate measures 
could be used. Options include recording subjects’ verbal rehearsal, allowing some amount of 
writing or typing, or even more frequent surveys, such that the queried strategies are recent and 
still fresh in memory. A second change is the use of stricter experimental controls on the 
encoding / stimulus display process. For example, elaborative, LTM-based strategies can be 
made difficult or impossible by use of short stimulus display times (Cowan et al., 2012), dual-
tasks (Chen & Cowan, 2009), or required distractor tasks that prevent rehearsal in the interval 
between study and test (e.g., the Brown-Peterson task – Brown, 1958; Peterson and Peterson, 
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1959). Such constraints on the encoding process were considered when first designing this 
experimental paradigm, but they were rejected as too difficult to reasonably implement. It 
seemed difficult, for example, to determine a fixed stimulus display duration that would be brief 
enough to discourage complex mnemonics yet long enough to allow most participants to encode 
potentially complex relational information into WM. Norming studies to determine typical 




CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
THE PRESENT EXPERIMENTS 
Experiment 1 served as a pilot to test the possibility of relational stacking in the cognitive 
domain. Participants studied relational facts comparing pairs of people (e,g., Sue is less artistic 
than Mary), each followed by a recognition probe. Both the number of role bindings and the 
number of name pairs were varied. According to extant models of WM, performance should be 
affected only by the number of role bindings that must be maintained in WM; according to the 
stacking account, while role bindings do matter, it should also be easier to learn a given number 
of role bindings when they are added onto an existing name pair. The results showed that 
accuracy was indeed higher when additional role bindings were added to a given pair.  
Experiment 2 addressed methodological complaints and alternative explanations while 
attempting to replicate the relational stacking effect. In order to address concerns that ambiguous 
task instructions had caused confusion as to what “yes” and “no” responses mean during the 
recognition probe, the task instructions were rewritten with significantly more detail. Likewise, 
training trials were also added. This experiment held role bindings constant and varied only the 
number of name pairs (2 or 4) in the study display. As before, accuracy in the recognition task 
was higher when role bindings were attached to a smaller number of name pairs.  
Together the results of Experiments 1 and 2 show that relational stacking can indeed be 
employed with cognitive relations (i.e., with written facts) in service of better using our limited 
WMC. It exists when I improve methods with better instructions, greater power from more 
numerous theoretically-relevant trials, and so on. These experiments also give a tentative range 
of the floor and ceiling for WM-based memory for verbal role bindings – study displays of 4 
RBs are typically easy, while those of 8 RBs are typically quite difficult. 
Experiment 3 tested the prediction that stacking in the cognitive world depends on a 
particular arrangement of information – in particular, because the unit of WM should be the set 
of items compared, onto which extra role bindings can be stacked. In contrast, other types of 
information should not usefully allow stacking of more stuff. Thus, one should not be able to 
stack arguments onto relations. This experiment again presented study displays of written 
relational facts, but this time, varied which kind of information was repeated – name pairs, 
relations, or nothing (control condition). My predictions were not confirmed – in fact, none of 
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the planned contrasts were significant. However, given the unusual response time characteristics 
(i.e., a full 25% of participants failed even to complete the experiment) it is hard to know what to 
make of these data. Long study times are a priori problematic in a supposedly WM-centric task 
because they may reflect elaborative strategies such as mnemonics or chunking (Cowan, 2001). 
There are a few tempting explanations, such as a reduction in statistical power stemming from 
variance in task strategies or other differences (i.e., between participants who finished and those 
who didn’t), or floor effects from an unusually unmotivated set of participants. Ultimately, the 
data were not clear enough, and the opportunities for post-hoc explanation too easy, to draw firm 
conclusions. The experiment was redesigned to address any potential concerns in these areas, 
allowing the subsequent replication to speak for itself. 
Experiment 4 addressed the concerns of both motivation and apparent variation in task 
strategies. Rather than course credit, participants were given monetary incentives for their 
performance. They earned a guaranteed $8 for participating, but also earned additional bonus 
payments for every question past the 60th (out of 120 total trials) that was answered correctly. 
Additionally, the per-question bonus payment increased after each 10 correct answers. The 
incentives were intended to promote both speeding through the task (i.e., not spending huge 
amounts of time per-question as was typical in Experiment 3) but still maintain high study effort 
(to alleviate the floor effects).  
Fortunately, Experiment 4 succeeded in smoothing out the unusual response time and 
accuracy distributions. Most participants completed the experiment, their recognition 
performance was closer to the middle of the measurement scale, and there was relative 
uniformity in the distribution of response times. Thus, even before statistical tests were run, the 
data seemed trustworthy: there was no reason to suspect either floor effects or heterogeneity in 
how the task was performed.  
Additionally, Experiment 4 confirmed both major predictions. Repeating name pairs led 
to better accuracy than repeating either relations or nothing: another instance of the relational 
stacking effect in action. More importantly, repeated relations did not lead to increased accuracy 
compared to the control condition. This null effect, produced in both Experiments 3 and 4, is 
consistent with the claim that stacking is constrained to the set of repeated arguments bound to 
relational roles and cannot be performed on other information.  
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Experiment 5 tested whether cognitive relational stacking arises from LTM-based 
processes (i.e., traditional chunking, explanation, or intentional strategy) or WM-based 
processes. As before, participants were tasked with studying sets of relational facts which varied 
in how many unique pairs of names instantiated the same number of role bindings and tested 
after each set with a recognition query. A mid-experiment survey was administered to discover 
which strategies participants had used up to that point. This survey also tipped off participants 
that such strategies were available, and in particular suggested using explanations or stories to tie 
together repeated name pairs. A post-experiment survey assessed strategy use during the second 
half of the trials.  
Experiment 5 once again showed that fewer, repeated name pairs on the same number of 
facts led to better memory. But despite an intervention that explicitly encouraged explanation, 
storytelling, and so on, the stacking effect was not predicted by how often such strategies were 
used. 
Taken as a whole, the present experiments show a very reliable stacking effect in the 
cognitive domain, as tested by written relational facts of repeated name pairs. Yet no benefit has 
been shown for repeated relations. The evidence that stacking is restricted to only certain kinds 
of repeated information strengthens the claim that it really is a measure of relational WMC. On 
the other hand, cognitive stacking shows nowhere near the space-saving efficiency of visual 
stacking – so the claim that the unit of WM is merely “the set of things being compared” is not as 
true in cognition. Capacity constraints outside the comparison set may play a much stronger role 
for WMC of words vs of visual objects.  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
There remains uncertainty as to the relative roles of WM and LTM and how they interact 
to accomplish stacking. One way to investigate their relative contributions is by attempting to 
induce proactive interference (e.g., Wickens et al., 1976). As it turns out, proactive interference 
is not observed unless stimulus lists have more than four items (i.e., unless they exceed the 
average individual WM capacity of four; Cowan, 2001). The implication is that proactive 
interference is a property of long-term memory processes: a target item is only vulnerable to 
inhibition or replacement by similar items during retrieval from LTM into WM. But if the entire 
stimulus set is maintained in WM, then no long-term retrieval is needed at test. Thus, one 
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potential study could begin with the usual cognitive stacking manipulation, varying the 
opportunities for stacking (i.e., the number of name pairs that instantiate a given number of role-
bindings). Here the usual result is expected. But critically, the number of similar facts preceding 
a target fact would also be varied. Similarity could be measured on the semantics of the relations 
or the names themselves. If the stacking effect of a target fact is reduced as a function of how 
many similar facts precede it (a classic buildup of proactive interference), then LTM may 
underlie the stacking effect. However, if no interference seems to build up, it would imply that 
stacked role bindings are held in WM and thus protected from interference. By the same logic, if 
stacking is vulnerable to proactive interference, it should also be sensitive to manipulations that 
release proactive interference. 
The current experimental methodology can be used to explore other types of compression 
in WM. An interesting option is transitivity, in which statements that compare common 
arguments on the same relation logically imply further statements. For example, if Jill is taller 
than Jeff and Jeff is taller than Robert, transitive inference concludes that Jill is taller than 
Robert. This is compression in that four role bindings can capture the full meaning of the original 
six (and can be later unpacked into their original form if needed). 
One line of research could study the conditions under which transitivity can be employed 
in WM tasks. It seems intuitive that some ways of presenting information more clearly broadcast 
the option of transitive inference than do others. One obvious clue is proposition order – consider 
the following two ways of presenting the same propositions, both of which afford transitive 
inference: (A r1 B, B r1 C, D r1 E) or (A r1 B, D r1 E, B r1 C). The former seems easier because 
arguments shared between propositions are directly adjacent and the order of the propositions 
match the arguments’ relative values. On the other hand, the latter seems more difficult, and 
must be mentally transformed before the critical inference can be made. Another clue that 
transitive inference is possible might be the type of relation used – in particular, it seems that 
concrete or physical relations (taller, wider, etc.) might be better clues than abstract relations 
(more suspicious, more thoughtful). Thus, a future study could manipulate obviousness of 
transitive possibility (i.e., adjacency, argument order, type of relation), and measure the effect on 
transitive inference (i.e., recognition questions of the same form used in the experiments of this 




If transitivity more readily springs to mind in response to certain arrangements of 
information over others, how can this insight be used to investigate the learning of transitive 
reasoning? Progressive alignment, in which easy examples are presented first and thus bootstrap 
performance on more difficult examples, has been successful in teaching relational categories to 
children (Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996) and probabilistic relational categories, which are 
especially difficult to learn, to adults (Jung and Hummel, 2011). Will progressive alignment 
facilitate performance in a memory test for transitive inferences? In this case, progressive 
alignment means beginning with the most obvious transitivity-affording trials (adjacent 
arguments, monotonically ordered propositions, concrete relations) and slowly relaxing these 
constraints over the course of the experiment, such that the hardest trials come last. If the 
progressive alignment hypothesis is correct, this should produce better performance than if trials 
are randomly ordered with respect to difficulty. 
On a more general note, there is a long tradition in cognitive psychology proving that 
“representation is everything”: the particular representations brought to bear on reasoning or 
problem-solving can exert a powerful influence (for either good or ill) on performance (e.g., 
Luchins, 1942; Kotovsky et al., 1985; Kaplan & Simon, 1990). The present experiments continue 
this tradition by showing that the right representation allows better use of limited WM capacity. 
If a reasoner can recast a problem in such a way that she can stack multiple relations on the same 
set of arguments, then she can effectively increase her WM capacity and thus reason more 





Ackerman, P. L., Beier, M. E., & Boyle, M. O. (2002). Individual differences in working 
memory within a nomological network of cognitive and perceptual speed abilities. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 131, 567–589. 
Andrews, G., & Halford, G. S. (2002). A cognitive complexity metric applied to cognitive 
development. Cognitive Psychology, 45(2), 153–219. 
Baddeley, A. (2012). Working memory: theories, models, and controversies. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 63, 1–29. 
Baddeley A.D., & Hitch, G.J. (1974). Working memory. In The Psychology of Learning and 
Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, ed. GA Bower, 47–89. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure for 
confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and Language, 68(3), 
10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001. 
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., Walker, S. (2015). Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models 
Using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1), 1-48. 
Bolker, B. M., Brooks, M. E., Clark, C. J., Geange, S. W., Poulsen, J. R., Stevens, M. H. H., & 
White, J. S. S. (2009). Generalized linear mixed models: a practical guide for ecology 
and evolution. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 24(3), 127–135.  
Brown, J. (1958). Some tests of the decay theory of immediate memory. Quarterly Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 10, 12–21. 
80 
 
Carpenter, P. A., Just, M. A., & Shell, P. (1990). What one intelligence test measures: a 
theoretical account of the processing in the Raven Progressive Matrices Test. Psychological 
Review, 97(3), 404–31. 
Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973). Perception in chess. Cognitive Psychology, 4(1), 55–81. 
Chen, Z., & Cowan, N. (2009). How verbal memory loads consume attention. Memory & 
Cognition, 37(6), 829–36.  
Cho, S., Holyoak, K. J., & Cannon, T. D. (2007). Analogical reasoning in working memory: 
resources shared among relational integration, interference resolution, and maintenance. 
Memory & Cognition, 35(6), 1445–1455.  
Clevenger, P. E., & Hummel, J. E. (2014). Working memory for relations among objects. 
Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 76(7), 1933–1953.  
Conway, A. R. A., Cowan, N., Bunting, M. F., Therriault, D. J., & Minkoff, S. R. B. (2002). A 
latent variable analysis of working memory capacity, short-term memory capacity, 
processing speed, and general fluid intelligence. Intelligence, 30, 163–183. 
Conway, A. R. A., Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2003). Working memory capacity and its 
relation to general intelligence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(12), 547–552.  
Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: a reconsideration of mental 
storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(1), 87–114; discussion 114–85. 
Cowan, N., Rouder, J. N., Blume, C. L., & Saults, J. S. (2012). Models of Verbal Working 
Memory Capacity: What Does It Take to Make Them Work? Psychological Review, 
119(3), 480–499.  
Cowan, N., & Morey, C. C. (2007). How Can Dual-Task Working Retention Limits Be Memory 
Investigated? Psychological Science, 18(8), 686–688.  
81 
 
Daneman, M., & Green, I. (1986). Individual differences in comprehending and producing words 
in context. Journal of Memory and Language, 25(1), 1–18.  
Daneman, M., & Merikle, P. M. (1996). Working memory and language comprehension: A 
meta-analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3(4), 422–433.  
De Groot, A. D. (1965). Thought and choice in chess (first Dutch edition in 1946). The 
Hague: Mouton Publishers. 
Egan, D. E., & Schwartz, B. J. (1979). Chunking in recall of symbolic drawings. Memory & 
Cognition, 7(2), 149–58. 
Engle, R. W. (2010). Role of Working‐Memory Capacity in Cognitive Control. Current 
Anthropology, 51(s1), S17–S26.  
Engle, R. W., Carullo, J. J., & Collins, K. W. (1991). Individual differences in working memory 
for comprehension and following directions. Journal of Educational Research, 84, 253-262. 
Engle, R. W., & Kane, M. J. (2004). Executive Attention, Working Memory Capacity, and a 
Two-Factor Theory of Cognitive Control. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: 
Advances in Research and Theory (Vol. 43). 
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. A. (1999). Working memory, 
short-term memory, and general fluid intelligence: A latent-variable approach. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 128(3), 309–331.  
Ericsson, K. A., Delaney, P. F., Weaver, G., & Mahadevan, R. (2004). Uncovering the structure 
of a memorist’s superior “basic” memory capacity. Cognitive Psychology, 49(3), 191–237. 
Ericsson, K. A., & Kintsch, W. (1995). Long-term working memory. Psychological Review, 
102(2), 211–45.  
82 
 
Gentner, D. (1988). Metaphor as structure mapping: The relational shift. Child Development, 59, 
47-59. 
Gilhooly, K., H Logie, R., E Wetherick, N., & Wynn, V. E. (1993). Working memory and 
strategies in syllogistic-reasoning tasks. Memory & cognition (Vol. 21).  
Halford, G. S., Baker, R., McCredden, J. E., & Bain, J. D. (2005). How many variables can 
humans process? Psychological Science, 16(1), 70–6. 
Halford, G. S., Wilson, W. H., & Phillips, S. (1998). Processing capacity defined by relational 
complexity: implications for comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychology. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(6), 803-831. 
Hummel, J.E. & Biederman, I. (1992). Dynamic binding in a neural network for shape 
recognition. Psychological Review 99(3), 480-517. 
Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (1997). Distributed Representations of Structure: A Theory of 
Analogical Access and Mapping. Psychological Review, 104(3), 427–466. 
Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (2003). A symbolic-connectionist theory of relational inference 
and generalization. Psychological Review, 110(2), 220–264.  
Jung, W., & Hummel, J. E. (2011). Progressive Alignment Facilitates Learning of Deterministic 
But Not Probabilistic Relational Categories. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Conference of 
the Cognitive Science Society, 2643–2648 
Kane, M. J., Hambrick, D. Z., & Conway, A. R. A. (2005). Working memory capacity and fluid 
intelligence are strongly related constructs: comment on Ackerman, Beier, and Boyle 
(2005). Psychological Bulletin, 131(1), 65–66.  
Kaplan, C. A., & Simon, H. A. (1990). In search of insight. Cognitive Psychology, 22, 374–419. 
83 
 
Kiewra, K. A., and Benton, S. L. (1988). The relationship between information-processing 
ability and notetaking, Contemporary Educational Psychology, 13, 33-44. 
Klein, K., & Boals, A. (2001). The relationship of life event stress and working memory 
capacity. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15(5), 565–579.  
Kotovsky, L., & Gentner, D. (1996). Comparison and Categorization in the Development of 
Relational Similarity. Child Development, 67(6), 2797–2822. 
Kotovsky, K., Hayes, J. R., & Simon, H. A. (1985). Why are some problems hard? Evidence 
from Tower of Hanoi. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 248–294. 
Kunde, W., Müsseler, J., & Heuer, H. (2007). Spatial Compatibility Effects With Tool Use. 
Human Factors, 49(4), 661–670.  
Kyllonen, P. C., & Christal, R. E. (1990). Reasoning ability is (little more than) working-
memory capacity?! Intelligence, 14(4), 389–433. 
Kyllonen, P. C., & Stephens, D. L. (1990). Cognitive abilities as determinants of success in 
acquiring logic skill. Learning and Individual Differences, 2, 129-160. 
Luchins, A. S. (1942). Mechanization in problem solving—the effect of Einstellung. 
Psychological Monographs,54(6), 195. 
Luck, S. J., & Vogel, E. (1997). The capacity of visual working memory for features and 
conjunctions. Nature, 390(6657), 279–281. 
McKeithen, K. B., Reitman, J. S., Rueter, H. H., & Hirtle, S. C. (1981). Knowledge organization 
and skill differences in computer programmers. Cognitive Psychology, 13(3), 307–325. 
Miller, G.A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity 
for processing information. The Psychological Review, 63, 81-97. 
84 
 
Morrison, R.G. (2005). Thinking in working memory. In K.J. Holyoak & R.G. Morrison (Eds.), 
Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning  (pp. 457-473). Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Nelson, D. L., McEvoy, C. L., & Schreiber, T. A. (1998). The University of South Florida word 
association, rhyme, and word fragment norms. http://www.usf.edu/FreeAssociation/. 
Norman, G. R., Brooks, L. R., & Allen, S. W. (1989). Recall by expert medical practitioners and 
novices as a record of processing attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 15(6), 1166-1174. 
Ormrod, J. E., & Cochran, K. F. (1988). Relationship of verbal ability and working memory to 
spelling achievement and learning to spell. Reading Research and Instruction, 28(1), 33–43.  
Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2008). Darwin’s mistake: explaining the 
discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31(2), 
109-30-178.  
Peterson, L. R., & Peterson, M. J. (1959). Short-term retention of individual verbal items. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 193–198. 
R Core Team (2013). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. http://www.R-project.org/. 
Rattermann, M. J., & Gentner, D. (1998). More evidence for a relational shift in the development 
of analogy: Children’s performance on a causal-mapping task. Cognitive Development, 13, 
453-478. 
Raven, J. C., Styles, I., & Raven, M. A. (1998). Raven’s Progressive Matrices: SPM plus test 




Richland, L. E., Morrison, R. G., & Holyoak, K. J. (2004). Working memory and inhibition as 
constraints on children's development of analogical reasoning. In K. Forbus, D. Gentner & 
T. Regier (Eds.), Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society (pp. 1149-1154). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information 
processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending and a general theory. Psychological 
Review, 84(2), 127–190.  
Sloboda, J.A. (1976). Visual perception of musical notation: registering pitch symbols in 
memory. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 28, 1-16. 
Social Security Administration (n.d.) Top Baby Names of 1993. Retrieved May 6, 2012 from 
https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/babynames/index.html 
Tohill, J. M., & Holyoak, K. J. (2000). The impact of anxiety on analogical reasoning. Thinking 
and Reasoning, 6(August 1999), 27–40. 
Toms, M., Morris, N. and Ward, D. 1993. Working-memory and conditional 
reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46A(4): 679–699.  
Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2007). A practical solution to the pervasive problems of p values. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(5), 779–804. http://doi.org/10.3758/BF03194105 
Waltz, J. A., Lau, A., Grewal, S. K., & Holyoak, K. J. (2000). The role of working memory in 
analogical mapping. Memory & Cognition, 28, 1205–1212. 
Wickens, D. D., Dalezman, R. E., & Eggemeier, F. T. (1976). Multiple encoding of word 
attributes in memory. Memory & Cognition, 4(3), 307–310.  
Winter, B. (2013). Linear models and linear mixed effects models in R with linguistic 
applications. arXiv:1308.5499.  
86 
 
Zhang, W., & Luck, S. J. (2008). Discrete fixed-resolution representations in visual working 
memory. Nature, 453(7192), 233–5. 
Zhang, W., & Luck, S. J. (2011). The number and quality of representations in working memory. 





APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENT 1 INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment, you will view sets of facts that relate pairs of people. After each set of facts, 
you will be given a recognition query. The query will present a fact on the screen and ask if it is 
one of those you just saw. Your job is to remember each set of facts long enough to answer the 
recognition query. 
 
After you are done studying a set of facts, press any key to proceed on to the recognition query. 
Press Y or N to indicate either "Yes, I just saw this" or "No, I did not just see this." 
 




APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENT 2 INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment, you will view sets of facts that relate pairs of people. After each set of 
facts, you will be given a yes or no question. The query will present a fact on the screen and ask 
if it is true. Your job is to remember each set of facts long enough to answer the question. 
After you are done studying a set of facts, press any key to proceed on to the question. Press Y or 
N to indicate either "Yes, this is true" or "No, this is not true." 
Note: sometimes, the question will be worded slightly differently than a fact you studied, 
but mean exactly the same thing. For example, if you study the fact, "Marty is less responsible 
than Jennifer", you might be asked, "Jennifer is more responsible than Marty?" You would say 
"yes" to this, since it means exactly the same thing.  
But the question might ask about something similar, but not exactly as same as, the 
studied fact. For example, suppose you study "Marty is less responsible than Jennifer". You 
could then be asked, "Marty is more childish than Jennifer?" You would say no, since it does not 
mean exactly the same thing.  
A warning: the question will _always_ involve people and adjectives that you have just 
studied. But "No" still might be the best answer.  
For example, suppose you study the facts "Michael is more tall than Jeff, Davy is more 
whiny than Roger." If you are then asked, "Davy is more tall than Jeff?" the correct answer is 
"No." This is because the study facts did not explicitly tell you whether Davy or Jeff is more tall. 
So don't just memorize which people and relationships are mentioned in the facts. In 
order to get the question right, you will need to remember _both_ the people involved AND the 
relationship(s) between them. 
First, we'll start with some practice trials. 





APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENT 4 PRE-TRAINING INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Remember, you will be paid at least $8 for participating. But if you do well, you can earn up to 
$15.32 in total. We will explain how to earn bonus payments in a few minutes. 
 
But for now, let's start with some practice trials. Pay attention: the better you understand the task 




APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENT 4 POST-TRAINING INSTRUCTIONS 
Okay, the real trials are about to start.  
 
Here's how the payment works. There will be 120 questions in total. Starting when you've 
correctly answered 60 questions, you will get bonus payments for every additional question you 
answer correctly. And as you get more questions correct, the bonus payment per question will 
increase. 
 
Starting at your 60th question correct, you'll get 5 cents more per question. 
Starting at your 72nd question correct, you'll get 7 cents more per question. 
Starting at your 84th question correct, you'll get 9 cents more per question. 
Starting at your 96th question correct, you'll get 15 cents more per question. 
Starting at your 108th question correct, you'll get 25 cents more per question. 
 
Notice that in order to earn more money, you must both 1) answer more questions, and 2) answer 
them correctly.  If you take a really long time answering each question perfectly, you won't earn 
much money. If you rush through the questions without trying, you won't earn much money. Do 
your best to be both fast AND accurate. 
 




APPENDIX E: EXPERIMENT 5 MID-EXPERIMENT SURVEY 
 
Note: There are no right or wrong answers, just answer honestly. We are interested in how 
people actually learn these materials. So if you are using a good trick or shortcut, tell us. 
Q1: You may have noticed that in some of the materials you studied, the same characters were 
mentioned in multiple sentences. Please tell us any particular strategies you used for these cases. 
 
Q2: How often did you use the strategies from the previous answer? Rate on a scale from 1 to 5, 
where 1 means "never" or "almost never", and 5 means "always" or "almost always." 
 
Q3: For sentences that repeated the same pair of names compared to sentences with different 
pairs of names, how were the strategies you used different? 
 
Q4: For the sentences which repeated the same pair of people, did you notice yourself trying to 
put the sentences together into a story or explanation in order to help your memory? Can you 
come up with any examples of sentences and the explanation/story you used? 
 
Q5: How often did you use the strategies from the previous answer? Rate on a scale from 1 to 5, 




APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENT 5 POST-EXPERIMENT SURVEY 
Note: There are no right or wrong answers, just answer honestly. We are interested in how 
people actually learn these materials. So if you are using a good trick or shortcut, tell us. 
Q1: Did the questions we asked in the middle of the experiment change your strategies? How? 
 
 
Q2: In the earlier survey, we mentioned a potential strategy for sentences which repeated the 
same pair of names. Specifically, you could make some kind of story or explanation to help you 
remember how the pair of people relate.  
Did you try using that strategy? If so, try to come up with some examples of facts you 
memorized or the stories/explanations you made up for them. 
 
 
Q3: How often did you use that strategy in the second half of the experiment? Rate on a scale 
from 1 to 5, where 1 means "never" or "almost never", and 5 means "always" or "almost always." 
 
 
Q4: Please tell us anything else you’d like about the task, the strategies you used, or your 
thoughts on the experiment. 
 
